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Abstract: 
This dissertation contributes to an increasing literature on macroeconomic instability 
in developing countries. It makes a critical review of the literature and classifies the sources 
of instability under exogenous and endogenous factors. It then argues that the impact of 
exogenous shocks is determined by the structural characteristics of the economy which act as 
a risk-management mechanism. The paper also explains that macroeconomic instability is 
both a cause and a reflection of underdevelopment. Whilst macroeconomic instability 
constraints the long-term growth and thus development, it is also the result of the co-
existence of various ‘underdeveloped structures’ in the economy. The paper also presents a 
case study on Afghanistan. Through a diagnostic approach, it identifies the sources of 
instability in the country and proposes a series of policies and reforms in order to overcome 
macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan.  
 
Résumé : 
 Le présent mémoire est une contribution aux études sur l’instabilité macroéconomique 
dans les pays en développement. Il fait un compte-rendu de la littérature, et classifie les 
sources de l’instabilité macroéconomique sous des facteurs exogènes et endogènes. Ensuite, 
il soutient que l’effet des chocs exogènes est déterminé par les caractéristiques structurelles 
de l’économie qui fonctionnent comme un mécanisme de gestion de risque. Ce mémoire 
explique que l’instabilité macroéconomique est à la fois une cause et un reflet de sous-
développement. D’une part, l’instabilité macroéconomique contraint la croissance de long-
terme et donc le développement, d’autre part, l’instabilité est le résultat de coexistence de 
différentes structures sous-développées dans l’économie. Ce mémoire présente aussi un cas 
d’étude sur l’Afghanistan. A travers d’une approche diagnostique à ce sujet, il identifie les 
sources de l’instabilité dans le pays et propose une série des politiques et des réformes en vue 
de surmonter l’instabilité macroéconomique en Afghanistan.  
 
JEL classification:  E32, E60, O11, O53 
Keywords:   Macroeconomic stability, Macroeconomic volatility, Macroeconomic  
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Policy analysis 
Author’s email address: omr.joya@gmail.com 
 iii
Table of contents 
Introducing key questions ..................................................................................................... 1 
Part I. Macroeconomic Instability ...................................................................................... 4 
1. Definition and some stylised facts ..................................................................................... 4 
1.1. Macroeconomic stability............................................................................................. 4 
1.2. Macroeconomic volatility ........................................................................................... 5 
1.3. Fluctuations in Real Business Cycle theory................................................................. 7 
1.4. Measuring volatility .................................................................................................... 8 
1.5. Stylised facts ............................................................................................................ 11 
2. Costs of macroeconomic instability ................................................................................. 15 
2.1. Negative impact on investment and long-term growth .............................................. 15 
2.2. Increase in inequality and poverty............................................................................. 17 
2.3. Welfare costs ............................................................................................................ 19 
3. Sources of macroeconomic instability ............................................................................. 21 
3.1. Exogenous factors .................................................................................................... 21 
(i) External and terms-of-trade shocks ......................................................................... 21 
(ii) Supply-side shocks ................................................................................................. 23 
(iii) Geography and market access .............................................................................. 23 
(iv) Social fragmentation ............................................................................................. 25 
(v) Aid volatility ........................................................................................................... 26 
3.2. Endogenous factors .................................................................................................. 26 
(i) Financial integration and depth .............................................................................. 27 
(ii) Trade openness ...................................................................................................... 29 
(iii) Diversification ...................................................................................................... 30 
(iv) Distortionary macroeconomic policies and policy instability ................................. 31 
(v) Weak institutions .................................................................................................... 32 
(vi) Microeconomic rigidities ...................................................................................... 34 
4. Macroeconomic instability and development ................................................................... 35 
Part II. Case study: Afghanistan ...................................................................................... 38 
1. The Afghan economy ...................................................................................................... 38 
1.1. Recent economic history ........................................................................................... 38 
1.2. The economy since 2002 .......................................................................................... 40 
1.3. Foreign aid in Afghan economy ................................................................................ 48 
1.4. Macroeconomic volatility in Afghanistan ................................................................. 51 
2. Diagnostic approach to macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan .................................. 53 
2.1. Sources of macroeconomic instability ....................................................................... 54 
(i) Price volatility ........................................................................................................ 54 
(ii) Growth volatility .................................................................................................... 59 
(iii) Overall macroeconomic instability ....................................................................... 61 
2.2. Solutions .................................................................................................................. 66 
(i) Stimulating output in “key” sectors ........................................................................ 67 
A. Agriculture sector ............................................................................................... 67 
B. Natural resources ................................................................................................ 70 
(ii) Diversifying the production structure ..................................................................... 76 
(iii) Acquiring high-quality institutions ........................................................................ 79 
(iv) Developing sound financial sector ......................................................................... 80 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 81 
References .......................................................................................................................... 84 
 
 
 
 iv
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Af./Afs.  Afghani(s) 
AISA   Afghanistan Investment Support Agency 
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DAB   Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank) 
DAC   Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD 
DFID   Department for International Development, United Kingdom 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization 
MAIL   Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Afghanistan 
MoCI   Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Afghanistan 
MoF   Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NRVA   National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 
ODA   Official development assistance 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
R&D   Research and Development 
SH   Solar Hijri (Persian calendar year) 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
UNSD   United Nations Statistics Division 
USGS   United States Geological Survey 
WDI   World Development Indicators, World Bank 
WEO   World Economic Outlook, IMF 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
 
 
Remarks on data 
The official calendar in Afghanistan is the Persian calendar, known as Solar Hijri. Its years 
are designated AP (Anno Persico) or SH. Financial year in Afghanistan is also adjusted 
according to the SH year, which starts on March 21
st
 in the Gregorian calendar. For example, 
the SH 1389 corresponds to Mar 21, 2010 – Mar 20, 2011. The annual national accounts data 
on Afghanistan is usually calculated over the SH years, regardless of the source of data. For 
example, the data on GDP whether reported by foreign sources such as IMF or UNSD or by 
local sources such as CSO or DAB refer to SH years. For simplicity, the annual national 
accounts data are sometimes indicated in a single Gregorian format such as 2010, instead of 
2010/11 (which both refer to 1389). 
 
A billion means a thousand million (= 109) and a trillion means a million million (= 1012). 
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Introducing key questions 
 
Developing countries have always been characterized with economic volatility and an 
uncertain macroeconomic environment. While developed countries have enjoyed stability 
since the 1980s, macroeconomic instability has been a serious concern in the developing 
world. From the Latin American debt crisis in 1982, to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and 
to the world food price crisis in 2007, developing countries have suffered from serious 
volatilities in output growth, inflation, exchange rate, interest rates, and other variables of 
concern. These macroeconomic volatilities are not only observed in low-income countries 
(LICs), but they are also present in middle-income economies. However, the source and 
nature of these volatilities differ from one group to another. The magnitude, depth and 
persistence of macroeconomic volatility are more pronounced in poor and least-developed 
countries (LDCs) than in more developed ones. For low-income countries, macroeconomic 
instability is of a major concern because it seriously affects the poor and has negative impact 
on their long-term growth. 
In a seminal paper, Lucas (1988) attracted the attention of economists to this 
phenomenon, noting that “within the advanced countries, growth rates tend to be very stable 
over long periods of time.... For poorer countries, however, there are many examples of 
sudden, large changes in growth rates, both up and down.” Since then, economists have 
specifically been interested in studying macroeconomic instability in developing countries. 
However, in traditional macroeconomics, there tended to be a dichotomy between “growth” 
and “volatility” in economic aggregates. Growth theory and Real Business Cycle (RBC) 
theory have traditionally been treated as unrelated areas of macroeconomics. Therefore, for a 
long time, economic volatility was treated as a secondary phenomenon in the business cycle 
literature. It was considered a second-order issue of interest and a phenomenon related to the 
fluctuations in the business cycle.  
However, since the seminal paper of Ramey and Ramey (1995) which showed that 
volatility and growth rate are strongly correlated, research on macroeconomic volatility has 
been carried out with methods and models independent from the RBC theory. 
Macroeconomic instability has thus developed into its own field of research over the last 
decade, thanks to the recognition that “non-linearities ... magnify the negative effects of 
volatility on long-run growth and inequality, especially in poor countries” (Aizenman and 
Pinto, 2005).  
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The concept of macroeconomic stability/instability was popularised during the 1980s 
with the stabilisation policies prescribed by the Washington-based institutions (i.e. 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) to the developing countries affected by the 
debt crisis. However, macroeconomic stability should not be conceived exclusively in the 
context of stabilisation policies of the IMF. Under the Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs), macroeconomic stability was defined in a very narrow sense; focusing primarily at 
low inflation, price stability, and low fiscal and current-account deficits. Nonetheless, such a 
narrow consideration was criticized by some economists from the academic milieu, both for 
not considering other important variables (mainly real variables, including unemployment) 
and for considering a very narrow margin of variability for some variables; for example 
insisting on single digit threshold for inflation (Stiglitz et al., 2006). The concept of 
macroeconomic stability has undergone considerable changes in the economic discourse. The 
contemporary definition of macroeconomic stability enjoys a much broader sense. 
It should also be noted that the concept of macroeconomic volatility is not necessarily 
associated with economic crises. Although volatility usually appears during the periods of 
crisis in developed countries, it is an endemic phenomenon in developing countries and must 
not be confined to instances of crisis
1
 (Malik and Temple, 2009). Moreover, a period of 
macroeconomic volatility is not necessarily a period of recession. A country can well suffer 
from macroeconomic volatility without “formally” being into an economic recession.2  
This dissertation contributes to the literature on macroeconomic instability in 
developing countries. The first part of this dissertation seeks to answer three sets of questions. 
First, what are the possible costs of macroeconomic volatility in terms of welfare and other 
economic indicators? Are there costs associated with macroeconomic instability or is macro 
instability neutral in regard to the welfare of the economy? Secondly, this dissertation 
identifies the exogenous and endogenous sources of macroeconomic instability by reviewing 
the results of empirical and theoretical studies. Finally, this paper seeks to answer if 
macroeconomic instability is a cause or a reflection of underdevelopment. This question is 
crucial for policy analysis, because if macroeconomic instability is a source of 
underdevelopment, then overcoming instability would be a key to prosperity and a solution to 
all underlying problems in LICs. And if it is a consequence and a reflection of 
underdevelopment, then instead of focusing on policies to overcome instability, policy-
makers should engage with broad-based structural and development policies. But if it is both 
                                                
1 For example, recent instances of crisis in the developing world include Mexico in 1995, Russia in 1998, 
Turkey in 2001, Argentina in 2002, and world commodity prices crisis in 2008. 
2 Although there is no formal definition for “economic recession,” but as a rule of thumb ‘two consecutive 
quarters of a decline in real GDP’ is considered a recession.  
 3
a cause and a reflection of underdevelopment, then it requires a more complex and in-depth 
analysis of the situation. 
The second part of this dissertation presents a case study on Afghanistan and makes 
diagnosis of macroeconomic instability in the country. It identifies the sources of instability 
and suggests a series of policies and reforms to overcome and to correct instability in the 
country. Afghanistan can be a good example for the analysis of macroeconomic instability, 
because since its political shift in 2002 it has experienced serious oscillations in economic 
growth and price level. The limitation of this paper is that it does not take into account the 
post-conflict explanations in analysing macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan. The 
analytical framework presented for the analysis of instability ignores the post-conflict 
characteristics of the country. 
The methodology employed in the two parts of this dissertation is different. In Part I, I 
make a critical review of the literature on macroeconomic instability in developing countries, 
and I classify the sources of instability under exogenous and endogenous factors. By 
classifying them so, I will show that these are the structural characteristics of the economy 
which determine the nature and level of impact of exogenous shocks on the economy. In Part 
II, I employ a diagnostic approach to treat macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan. First, I 
will identify the sources of instability in Afghanistan through quantitative and qualitative 
analytical methods. Secondly, I will propose some general policies which can help reduce the 
economy’s exposure to external shocks and install stability in the macroeconomic 
environment.  
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Part I. Macroeconomic Instability 
 
The first part of this dissertation is divided into four sections. The first section 
attempts to give a definition of macroeconomic instability and presents some stylised facts on 
macroeconomic volatility. The second and third sections make review of the literature on 
macroeconomic instability; they explain economic costs of macroeconomic volatility and 
identify the exogenous and endogenous factors which induce instability in the economy. 
Finally, the last section explains whether macroeconomic instability is a source or a reflection 
of underdevelopment.  
1. Definition and some stylised facts 
1.1. Macroeconomic stability 
 
The concept of macroeconomic stability is widely used in the policy-oriented 
literature, but is almost never properly defined. Based on a large literature which deals with 
this subject but which has rarely attempted to formally define this term, I present a definition 
which covers the various – and yet closely related – meanings understood from this concept. 
Macroeconomic stability can be described as a situation in which: (i) the level and growth in 
key macroeconomic variables, as well as the relevant balances between them, are sustainable; 
(ii) variability of macroeconomic variables is moderate and lies within an acceptable range; 
and/or (iii) full uncertainty regarding the macroeconomic environment does not exist. 
The first part of the definition refers to having a sustainable growth rate, low 
unemployment, moderate inflation, and enjoying internal and external balances; for example, 
balance between domestic demand and output, balance of payments, fiscal balance, and 
balance between savings and investment. However, these relationships need not necessarily 
be in exact balance (IMF, 2001). Imbalances such as fiscal and current account deficits or 
surpluses can perfectly exist in a stable macroeconomic environment, provided if they are 
sustainable. Furthermore, there is no unique set of thresholds for each macroeconomic 
variable between stability and instability (IMF, 2001), and there is no consensus on the range 
within which the levels of these variables should lie. For example, the IMF strongly 
emphasizes on keeping inflation rate in single digits or even as lower as possible, while, on 
the other hand, other economists maintain that having an inflation rate between 20 and 30 
percent is totally sustainable for developing countries and will not have any negative effect 
on their growth (Stiglitz et al., 2006). 
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The second part of the definition implies that the variability of macroeconomic 
variables should be small. But defining a range for each variable would be inaccurate and 
improper, because the amplitude of fluctuation for a given variable would depend on the level 
of balance between other relevant macroeconomic identities. However, the exchange rate has 
sometimes been subjected to the establishment of a ‘range’ under monetary management 
systems and stability pacts. For example, the Bretton Woods agreement initially set a one-
percent band for the pegged exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar, and the Maastricht 
criteria fixed the exchange rate fluctuation for the members of the Economic and Monetary 
Union of the European Union at a margin of 2.25 percent. 
The third component reflects the idea that the behaviour and overall movement of 
macroeconomic variables should be predictable by economic agents and should not subject to 
full uncertainty. For example, an environment where investors can predict the future rates of 
growth and inflation and where there is no major uncertainty over the policy makers’ 
decisions can be characterized with macroeconomic stability. 
Historically, during the post-war years dominated by Keynesian thinking, 
macroeconomic stability basically meant a mix of external and internal balance, which in turn 
implied full employment and stable economic growth, accompanied by low inflation. During 
the 1970s and 1980s (and further during 1990s), price stability, and fiscal and current-account 
balances moved to the centre of attention, supplanting the Keynesian emphasis on “real” 
economic activity. In recent years, the emphasis has once again been put on real stability 
(unemployment re-gaining importance), long-term sustainable and equitable growth, and 
healthy financial sector (Ocampo, 2005). Stiglitz et al. (2006) emphasize that focus should 
not only be on price stability but on real variables (real output, unemployment, and 
inequality) as well, and one has to distinguish between intermediate goals (such as inflation) 
and final objectives (such long-term, equitable growth). 
1.2. Macroeconomic volatility 
 
Despite the fact that ‘macroeconomic instability’ and ‘macroeconomic volatility’ tend 
to be employed interchangeably and are closely inter-related, there exists, however, a minor 
difference between these two terms.  
Montiel and Servén (2004) refer macroeconomic instability to “phenomena that 
decrease the predictability of the domestic macroeconomic environment.” Some other 
economists, however, define macroeconomic instability in a much broader sense, as “a 
situation of economic malaise, where the economy does not seem to have settled in a steady 
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position” (Azam, 2001). Macroeconomic instability can take the form of volatility of key 
macroeconomic variables or of unsustainability in their behaviour (Montiel and Servén, 
2004). Thus, in addition to the concept of volatility, “unsustainable” performances in 
macroeconomic variables (such as low and unstable growth rate, high inflation, large 
unemployment, unsustainable fiscal and current-account deficits, etc.) are also included in the 
definition of instability, while macroeconomic volatility refers uniquely to large fluctuations 
in macro variables and to the uncertainty associated with them. There can well be a situation 
which could qualify as of macroeconomic instability, but not as macroeconomic volatility; 
for example, a country which suffers from low economic growth, high inflation and large 
fiscal deficit, but their respective rates and levels are stable and non-volatile.   
Hence, this paper defines macroeconomic instability as a situation where: (i) 
unsustainable imbalances appear in the economy; (ii) variability in key macroeconomic 
variables is large (i.e. exceeding a certain threshold); and/or (iii) macroeconomic 
environment is highly uncertain. 
It would not be irrelevant to elaborate the differences between volatility, uncertainty, 
and risk. Aizenman and Pinto (2005) make the following distinction between the three of 
them: Uncertainty describes a situation where several possible outcomes are associated with 
an event, but the assignment of probabilities to the outcomes is not possible. Risk, in contrast, 
permits the assignment of probabilities to the different outcomes. Volatility – or variability – 
is allied to risk in that it provides a measure of the possible variation or movement in a 
particular economic variable or some function of that variable, such as growth rate. It is 
measured based on observed realizations of a random variable over some historical period. 
Conceptually, total variability can be decomposed into ‘predictable’ and ‘unpredictable’ 
components. Unpredictable variability captures pure risk or uncertainty, and constitutes a 
“shock.” It can be measured or computed as the residual from a forecasting equation for total 
variability.  
Another distinction is sometimes made between “normal volatility” and “crisis 
volatility.” Crisis volatility is a continuum of large or extreme shocks, exceeding a certain 
cut-off point. There are three methods to define extreme volatility: the imposition of an 
absolute threshold in magnitude (for example, commodity price changes of more than 10 
percent), the imposition of a distributional threshold (the 5 percent largest declines), and the 
use of a deviation criterion (observations that are at least 2 standard deviations above the 
mean) (Wolf, 2005). It is also important to note that risks associated with macroeconomic 
volatilities are aggregate or common risks which affect most or all economic sectors equally, 
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in contrast to idiosyncratic risks which affect only specific individuals or particular groups of 
economic sectors (World Bank, 2000). 
In this dissertation, the terms volatility and instability may have been used 
synonymously in some places.  
1.3. Fluctuations in Real Business Cycle theory 
 
Traditional macroeconomic theory suggested that transitory shocks do not have 
irreversible and permanent effects. Therefore, analysis of fluctuations was done in the context 
of aggregate supply/aggregate demand model, while evolution of long term variables was 
analysed through growth models. This dichotomy between the theoretical analysis of 
fluctuations and of growth relates to the static decomposition between cycle and trend; it 
therefore assumes that shocks do not have permanent effect on the level of a series. 
However, the dichotomy between cycle and trend was challenged by several empirical 
and theoretical researches during the 1970s and 1980s. These studies showed that short-term 
movements in all macroeconomic aggregates have an impact on the long-run level of their 
series (i.e. their trends). In other words, transitory shocks which are at the basis of cyclical 
phenomenon persist in the long run. Macroeconomic time series are, thus, composed of 
permanent (trend) and cyclical components. However, the acknowledgement of this fact has 
serious implications. At the statistical level, it makes the traditional dichotomy between cycle 
and trend unmeaningful. In fact, the trend cannot be considered independent of and 
unaffected from transitory shocks. And at the theoretical sphere, it requires analysing the 
fluctuations and the growth in a unified way (Hairault, 2000). This latest methodology 
constitutes the principals of the real business cycle (RBC) theory.  
The RBC model extends the Neo-classical growth model in three main ways: First, it 
adds a labour-leisure choice which allows for the possibility of variable employment over 
time, and thus flexible wages. The RBC theory further assumes that prices in other markets 
are also flexible and that markets always clear out. Secondly, it allows for random shocks to 
exogenous real variables. In particular, it allows for variations in “technology” and/or 
government spending. As a result, households and firms face uncertainty regarding future 
variables. Finally, it assumes that economic agents make rational expectations about the 
future and operate in competitive markets. 
In general, RBC theory models the economy using dynamic general equilibrium 
models (DGEM). A simple RBC model is based on the same aggregate function as that in a 
neoclassical growth model with constant return to scales: 
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( , )t t t tY F K A L=       (1) 
where 
tA  
is an exogenous process of technology which evolves according to a trend 
stationary model, such as: 
 
ln lnt tA A gt z= + +       (2) 
lnA is a constant, g is the trend growth rate (assumed to be known with certainty) and tz
represents deviations around the trend. These deviations from trend are further assumed to 
follow a first-order autoregressive process: 
 1t z t tz zρ ε−= +       (3) 
where zρ is a persistence parameter and tε represents a “technology shock.”  
 Hence, according to RBC theory, shocks which induce fluctuations and cyclical 
behaviour are induced by stochastic variations in technology and these technological and 
productivity shocks are persistent over some period of time (depending on the value of zρ ). 
Movements in output and employment are thus seen as efficient responses of a perfectly 
competitive economy to a productivity shock. 
However, the recent literature which has emerged independently from the RBC theory 
has investigated other sources of volatility, especially in the context of developing countries. 
These sources of volatility will be discussed in detail in section I.3. 
1.4. Measuring volatility 
 
A necessary condition for measuring volatility in an economic time series is that the 
series of interest must be stationary – meaning its mean and variance should be constant over 
time. However, many economic variables are non-stationary in level; they fluctuate around a 
changing mean and the size of volatility varies over time. For example, the GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) is usually non-stationary, which increases with varying average and its 
fluctuations around this rising trend are also variable. There are two major ways to make a 
series stationary. 
The first method is to simply take the first difference of the series. Although first-
differencing may not always be sufficient to obtain stationarity; sometimes a second 
difference may be necessary. First-differencing is, in fact, akin to taking the growth rate of 
the series. If the variable is expressed in logarithmic form, then first-difference approximates 
a growth rate, as shown in the following equation: 
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1
1
log( ) log log log tt t
t
X
X X X
X
−
−
 
∆ = − =  
 
    (4) 
 The second method is to separate the permanent component (trend) from the 
transitory component (cycle) in the data. Once the permanent component is removed from the 
data, the cyclical component can then be analysed. Several methods have so far been 
proposed in econometrics for decomposing a series into trend-cycle elements. Here, I restrict 
myself in explaining very briefly the two most widely used methods, namely the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) and the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition 
(Beveridge and Nelson, 1981). 
 The Hodrick-Prescott technique extracts the trend ( tµ ) by minimizing the following 
sum of squares program: 
 
{ }
1
1
2 2
1 1
1 2
min ( ) [( ) ( )]T
t t
T T
t t t t t t
t t
X
µ
µ λ µ µ µ µ
=
−
+ −
= =
− + − − −∑ ∑   (5) 
where λ  is an arbitrary constant reflecting the cost or penalty of incorporating fluctuations 
into the trend. The first term in expression (5) is the penalty associated with the deviation of 
the adjusted trend ( tµ ) from the actual series ( tX ). The second term penalizes the adjusted 
trend if its growth over a period is very different from its growth in the previous one. Thus λ  
acts as a smoothing parameter; it controls the smoothness of the adjusted trend ( tµ ); if 
0λ → , the trend approximates the actual series. If λ →∞ , the trend becomes linear. The 
value ofλ  depends on the frequency of data with the standard measures being λ =100 for 
annual data, λ =1600 for quarterly data, and λ =14400 for monthly data.  
 The trend component in Hodrick-Prescott decomposition is therefore a weighted 
average of past, present and future values. The cyclical component is the residual which is 
defined as: 
 
J
c
t t t t j t j
j J
x X X a Xµ −
=−
= − = − ∑      (6) 
 The second method, Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, states that any unit root 
process can be written as a sum of a random-walk process and a stationary process: 
(1 ) (1) ( )t t tx L x A e C L e∆ ≡ − = −      (7) 
where L is the number of lags; 2 31 2 3( ) 1 .....A L A L A L A L= + + + +  is a polynomial with 
infinite degree; A(1) can be interpreted as the multiplier of a shock observed in t; and te is a 
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random variable which constitutes a shock. (1) tA e represents the non-stationary component 
and ( ) tC L e is the stationary component. 
( ) (1) ( )C L A A L= −  is verified, and by construction C(1)=0.  
2 3
1 2 3
2
1 2 3
( ) (1) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) .....
( ) (1 )[ (1 ) (1 ) .....
C L A A L A L A L A L
C L L A A L A L L
= − = − + − + − +
= − + + + + + +
 
( ) (1 ) ( )C L L B L= −         (8) 
where B(L) represents a polynomial of lags. By replacing (8) in equation (7), we obtain: 
0
(1)
( ) (1) ( )
1
t
t t t t i t
i
A
x e B L e A e B L e
L
−
=
= + = +
− ∑      (9) 
Equation (9) shows that 
tx is composed of a trend component, called stochastic trend 
because it depends on the sum of all shocks since the initial date, and a cyclical component 
which is stationary. We also observe that there is a serial correlation between the stochastic 
trend and the cyclical component, because they are both affected simultaneously by the same 
shock te .  
 Once a non-stationary series is made stationary, there are several techniques to 
measure its volatility. Following are some of the most usual techniques: 
Mean absolute deviation:   
1
( )c ct tx mean x
T
−  
Standard deviation:    ( )21 ( )c ct tx mean x
T
−∑  
Coefficient of variation:   
( )
( )
c
t
c
t
Var x
mean x
 
Relative standard deviation (in %):  
( )
100
( )
c
t
c
t
Var x
mean x
×  
 All these measures of volatility are calculated either on the cyclical component of the 
series (already in log), or on the growth rate (equivalent to the logarithmic first difference in 
level) of the series. Hence, the standard deviation must be between 0 and 1. The relative 
standard deviation is expressed in percentage, and it is useful when comparing two or more 
series with different units or scales.  
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1.5. Stylised facts 
 
(i) Volatility is larger and more persistent in developing countries than in advanced 
economies: 
One of the macroeconomic features of developing countries which distinguish them 
from advanced economies is a higher degree of economic volatility. Empirical studies show 
that macroeconomic volatility is “negatively” correlated with the level of income of the 
country. Figure 1.1 shows that developing countries with lower level of income per capita 
tend to have higher growth volatility, while developed countries with higher income per 
capita enjoy less volatile growth. 
Rand and Tarp (2002) found that output volatility in developing countries is 15 to 20 
percent higher than that in developed countries. Developing countries also show considerable 
persistence in output fluctuations (Agénor et al. 2000). Malik and Temple (2009) observed 
that over the period of 1960-
1999, “the median (across 
countries) of the standard 
deviation of annual growth 
rates was more than three 
times higher for low-income 
countries than for OECD 
member countries.” The 
explanations behind this 
stylised fact are that 
developing countries have 
‘underdeveloped economic 
structures’ such as 
underdeveloped financial 
sector, weak institutions, weak automatic stabilizers, inadequate and undiversified trade 
structure, distortionary policies and microeconomic rigidities. These elements will be 
elaborated in detail in section I.3. 
Historically, developed countries have enjoyed stable macroeconomic performance 
since the 1980s, while, in contrast, macroeconomic volatility has severed in the developing 
world. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 compare macroeconomic volatility in the United States and in 
Argentina, respectively. The U.S. economy has become much less volatile since 1985, as the 
volatility of GDP growth has fallen by more than half since then. Many observers refer to this 
Figure 1.1: Growth volatility and level of income 
Source: Koren et al. (2007) 
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phenomenon as the “Great Moderation.” Conversely, volatility in the Argentinean economy 
has increased since 1980, both in magnitude and in frequency; crisis volatility has appeared 
more often and more severely in Argentina. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Volatility in developing countries is a function of business cycles in developed 
countries: 
Empirical studies have also found that output fluctuations in developing countries are 
positively correlated with economic activity in industrial countries and negatively correlated 
with real interest rates in such countries (Agénor et al. 2000; Kouparitsas, 2001). This 
relationship could be significantly important for those developing countries which have 
Figure 1.3: Volatility in Argentina’s GDP per capita growth (1960-2008) 
Source: Loayza (2007) 
Figure 1.2: Volatility in US real GDP growth (five year moving variance) 
Source: FRBSF (2008) 
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Figure 1.4: Cyclical movement in GDP growth in developed and developing countries 
substantial trade links with industrial countries. Agénor et al. (2000) found that for many of 
developing economies that have positive correlations with the economic activity in advanced 
economies, “the correlations generally peak at or near a zero lag, suggesting that output 
fluctuations in industrial economies are transmitted fairly quickly.” Business cycle conditions 
in industrial economies could also influence fluctuations in developing economies through 
the world real interest rate. The latter is likely to have an important effect on economic 
activity in developing world, not only because it affects domestic interest rates, but also 
because it reflects credit conditions in international capital markets. 
 
(iii) Small economies “intrinsically” experience higher economic volatility: 
This is similar to the first stylised fact, but what differs is the explanation given for 
the source of volatility. The first stylised fact stated that developing countries experience 
higher volatility because they have underdeveloped economic structures, but in here the 
argument is that it is simply because they are “economically smaller” (Crucini, 1997; Easterly 
and Kraay, 2000; Ahmed and Suardi, 2009). Technically speaking, the argument is based on 
the ‘aggregation’ of idiosyncratic shocks to individuals in an economy (Canning et al., 1998). 
The transfer and aggregation of shocks depend on the strength of correlations or interactions 
between individuals and on the strength of microeconomic links between agents in the 
economy. At the aggregate level, macroeconomic volatility (as the aggregation of all 
idiosyncratic shocks at micro level) declines with the size of the economy because the 
aggregation of shocks is not perfectly linear. In short, the larger the size of the economy is, 
the smaller the magnitude of volatility will be (Canning et al., 1998). 
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Crucini (1997) compared G7 countries with 68 smaller countries, using a one-sector 
two-country general equilibrium model in which the only source of heterogeneity is the 
economy size. He showed that even if developing countries were developed, had the same 
market structure, the same financial, monetary and fiscal institutions, and faced the same 
underlying disturbances, they would still experience more severe business cycles. He gives 
the following explanation for this phenomenon: Consider two countries with substantial 
difference in their size of economy, and suppose that productivity rises in the smaller 
economy while remaining unchanged in the larger economy. Physical capital will flow from 
the larger country to the smaller country until the marginal product of capital is equated 
internationally.1 Owing to the asymmetry in economic size, the total amount of world capital 
that must be reallocated is quite small since each unit per capita reduction in capital in the 
large country increases the per capita capital stock in the small country many times over 
(moving the marginal product of capital in the small country downward very quickly). As a 
consequence, the changes in investment and output in the small country, in response to both 
domestic and foreign shocks, will be much larger than those in the larger country. Therefore, 
internal and external shocks generate more severe fluctuations in small countries.  
(iv) Terms-of-trade and output fluctuations are strongly positively correlated: 
The relationship between cyclical movements in the terms of trade and output 
fluctuations has been found to be significant and strong. The greater the openness of the 
economy, the greater is the correlation between terms-of-trade and growth volatility. This 
issue will be elaborated in detail in section I.3.1. 
(v) Real wage fluctuations are procyclical: 
Establishing stylised facts about the cyclical behaviour of real wages has important 
implications for discriminating among different classes of models. For instance, Keynesian 
models imply that real wages are countercyclical, whereas equilibrium models of the business 
cycle imply that real wages are procyclical. Empirical studies, however, support the fact that 
there is a procyclical variation in real wages (Agénor et al. 2000; Male, 2009). Real wages 
increase in periods of expansion and higher growth, and decline in periods of recession and 
slow economic growth. 
 
                                                
1 The argument does not require exact equality of marginal products across countries, but only requires that 
capital flow should be in the direction which could reduce the difference between the countries. 
 15
2. Costs of macroeconomic instability 
 
 Recent research and studies have found that macroeconomic instability has significant 
costs in terms of welfare loss, increase in inequality and poverty, and decline in long-term 
growth. Below are some of the most important consequences of macroeconomic instability as 
identified by empirical and theoretical studies. 
2.1. Negative impact on investment and long-term growth 
 
 Theoretical growth models, such as the AK and Schumpeterian models, suggest that 
volatility induces a higher growth rate (Aghion and Banerjee, 2005). In an AK model, long-
run growth is entirely driven by capital accumulation, and the average growth rate depends 
positively on the savings rate. Macroeconomic volatility will have a priori ambiguous 
effects: (i) to the extent that it increases uncertainty about future income, individuals increase 
precautionary savings, which in turn leads to a higher equilibrium savings rate and thus 
higher average growth rate; (ii) But to the extent that macroeconomic instability is associated 
with higher uncertainty about the expected return to saving, it may reduce the propensity to 
save, thereby lower growth rate. At the end, the dominance of these two opposing effects 
depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in individual consumption over time. If 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than 1, the final effect of macroeconomic 
instability is to reduce the expected return to saving and thus discourage savings. But the 
empirical results show that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is generally less than 1, 
and therefore volatility increases the growth rate. 
In a Schumpeterian model, growth is generated through short-run capital investments 
and long-term productivity-enhancing investments such as R&D, and organisational capital. 
During the periods of recession, there is lower return to productive capital investments due to 
lower demand. On the contrary, the opportunity-cost of productivity-enhancing investments 
is lower. Hence, firms engage in R&D and creation of organisational capital. These 
productivity-enhancing investments during economic recessions will finally increase the 
future long-run growth.  
Empirical studies, however, have found totally different results. In a seminal paper, 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) pointed out that volatility is not neutral; it has adverse effects on 
growth. They showed that countries with higher volatility have lower mean growth, even 
after controlling for other country-specific growth correlates. They explained that “the 
negative effect of volatility stems mainly from volatility of innovations to GDP growth, 
which reflects uncertainty.”  
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Macroeconomic volatility hampers growth through creating uncertainty in the 
macroeconomic environment and depressing the private investment. In fact, investment is 
subject to irreversibility and asymmetric adjustment costs. Following exogenous shocks, 
private capital formation will be negatively affected (Agénor, 2004) and private investment 
declines. There are also several other channels through which macroeconomic instability may 
affect private investment. In the presence of uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment, 
risk-averse firms will not invest in risky activities and will reallocate resources to safer yet 
less productive activities. Therefore the level of capital accumulation may decrease in the 
economy. Macroeconomic instability also affects the “confidence” of economic agents, 
which can discourage domestic investment and lead to capital flight – which has potential 
adverse effects on long-term growth. If macroeconomic instability is conjoined with higher 
level of inflation, it may lower investment by distorting price signals and the information 
content of relative price changes (Agénor, 2004). In addition, a high variable inflation rate 
has adverse effect on expected profitability – if firms are risk averse, their level of investment 
will fall.  
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) found that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
growth volatility leads to 1.3 percentage-point drop in the growth rate – which represents a 
sizeable loss. Under a crisis situation, the loss would further increase to 2.1 percentage points 
Figure 1.5: Volatility and growth of GDP per capita (1960-2000) 
Source: Loayza et al. (2007) 
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Figure 1.6: Volatility and Income inequality 
Source: Wolf (2005) 
of per capita growth rate. They also found that the adverse effects of volatility on growth is 
larger in countries that are poor, institutionally underdeveloped, undergoing intermediate 
stages of financial development, or are unable to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies.  
It can also be argued that if macroeconomic instability affects negatively the long-
term growth, then it may also slow down the development process in the country, since 
having a sustainable growth is a necessary condition – if not sufficient – for the development. 
Did the countries which enjoyed “better” macroeconomic stability developed faster compared 
to those that suffered from serious macroeconomic instability? The answer to this question is 
yet to be explored. It can be an important area of research for future studies. 
2.2. Increase in inequality and poverty 
 
 Macroeconomic instability can affect poverty through its impact on income 
distribution. Cross-country studies have found a negative correlation between volatility and 
inequality. Figure 1.6 plots the relationship between growth volatility and income inequality 
(measured by the income share of the bottom quintile) over the period 1957-1999. However, 
the causality between inequality and volatility can go in both directions. On the one hand, 
macroeconomic instability can lower incentives for human capital accumulation which is a 
good determinant of the level of inequality. Volatility affects different segments of the 
population differently – depending on the nature and source of macro volatility; it may affect 
negatively the poor while benefiting the rich. In fact, at the trough of a business cycle, since 
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the poor do not have self-insurance mechanisms they are affected through a reduction in their 
income. While the rich who are well protected by self-insurance mechanisms may not 
experience any decline in income. Hence, growth volatility may increase inequality between 
the rich and the poor. On the other hand, inequality itself can increase social instability and 
thus macroeconomic volatility.  
 Laursen and Mahajan (2005), after controlling for the endogeneity between volatility 
and inequality, found that the negative effect of macroeconomic volatility on income 
inequality is statistically significant and robust. They also found that the magnitude of this 
effect is different across regions which may be due to differences in structural characteristics 
and in risk-management mechanisms.  
 Macroeconomic instability can affect income distribution through 5 different channels 
(Laursen and Mahajan, 2005): relative prices between different goods and services or 
between factor inputs and outputs; labour demand and employment; returns on physical 
assets and capital gains or losses; public or private transfers; and community environment 
effects. The relative importance of these different transmission channels depends, however, 
on the source and nature of volatility. For example, the effect on income distribution of a 
macroeconomic volatility that is induced by a shock to agricultural commodity prices is 
different than a one induced by a financial shock. Nonetheless, in most cases the poorest 
segment of the population bears the largest burden of the adverse effects of macroeconomic 
instability. First, their income sources are less diversified – usually their only source of 
income is their labour earnings. Secondly, their lower levels of assets and limited access to 
financial services make it more difficult to seek self-insurance. And finally, the poor depend 
more on public transfers and social services, mainly for health and education, which are 
likely to be cut during the periods of crises.  
Hence, by raising income inequality, macroeconomic instability can contribute to an 
increase in poverty in the society. Negative income shocks may affect income distribution 
either temporarily which increases transitory poverty, or permanently which in this case 
exacerbates chronic poverty (Laursen and Mahajan, 2005). Even if effective poverty-
alleviation and pro-poor policies are undertaken in order to halt the impact of macro 
instability on poverty, it is suspected that at least macroeconomic instability will “result in 
slower poverty reduction for a given average rate of growth” (Guillaumont and Korachais, 
2008). 
As stated earlier, the causality can also run from inequality to macroeconomic 
instability. A high degree of inequality has not only negative implications for long-term 
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development but also for short-term macroeconomic fluctuations (Agénor and Montiel, 
2008). Income inequality may create social instability which can exacerbate macroeconomic 
instability. In addition, countries with high levels of income inequality tend to have a small 
and volatile tax base; this may translate into high volatility of public expenditures. Iyigun and 
Owen (2004) argued that income inequality may engender private consumption variability 
when the ability to obtain credit depends on income. Using cross-country panel data for the 
period 1969-1992, they found that in high-income countries, greater income inequality is 
associated with more growth volatility in consumption and real GDP, whereas in low-income 
countries, higher levels of income inequality tend to be associated with less volatility. A 
possible reason for such different effects in high- and low-income countries is that financial 
development and availability of credit are positively associated with higher levels of per 
capita income. Ghiglino and Venditti (2007), using a neo-classical growth model with 
preference heterogeneity functions, showed that wealth inequality may also lead to 
endogenous fluctuations in growth. Therefore, developing countries which are characterized 
by inequality intrinsically experience macroeconomic instability. 
2.3. Welfare costs 
 
 Macroeconomic instability has both a direct and an indirect welfare cost for the 
economy. Its direct welfare loss is generated through causing consumption volatility. Studies 
show that the welfare gains from reducing consumption volatility can be substantial (Loayza 
et al., 2007). It also entails an indirect welfare cost through its adverse effect on income 
growth and development. 
 Lucas (1987) in his famous book “Models of Business Cycles” tried to estimate the 
welfare costs of economic fluctuations, as he himself puts it, in order “to get a quantitative 
idea of the importance of stabilization policy relative to other economic questions.” Lucas 
estimated that the welfare costs of economic fluctuations are very insignificant; merely 0.05 
percent of consumption per capita. A number of recent studies, however, have questioned this 
finding. Reis (2006) found that the welfare cost of macroeconomic volatility is significantly 
higher than what Lucas had calculated. Reis estimated that the costs of eliminating the 
uncertainty that induces macroeconomic volatility are between 0.5 and 5 percent of per capita 
consumption. He explains that such a significant welfare loss is caused by its impact on 
precautionary savings and investment. Reis calibrated his model using the U.S. data.  In terms 
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of nominal value, 5 percent of household consumption could represent more than US$ 450 
billion,1 which is a substantial cost for the society. 
 Pallage (2003) argued that the welfare costs of macroeconomic volatility are 
substantially larger in poor countries than in the United States. Using several models, 
including Lucas’ (1987), he computed the welfare cost of aggregate fluctuations in LICs and 
then contrast these costs with estimates obtained from the same models using US data. 
Pallage found that the median welfare cost of business cycles in LICs typically range from 10 
to 30 times its estimate for the United States. He also emphasized that for poor countries “the 
welfare gain from eliminating aggregate fluctuations may in fact be so large as to exceed that 
of receiving an additional 1% of growth forever.” Although Pallage’s estimates cannot be 
taken as an absolute welfare cost of macroeconomic instability in LICs, what is certain is that 
its welfare loss is much larger in poor countries than in the advanced economies. In fact, 
macroeconomic volatility disproportionately affects the poor because consumption patterns 
are much more sensitive to fluctuations in income at low levels of income. 
 These recent findings may suggest a re-thinking of economic policies in poor 
countries. Washington-based international institutions have always recommended developing 
countries the policies which focused exclusively on generating growth. Yet not many 
countries succeeded to obtain long-term stable growth. Despite landmark achievements in 
economic theory, economists have not yet been able to offer an ultimate solution for 
countries which suffer from growth-retarding characteristics (Easterly, 2002). A fair approach 
would be to accompany growth-enhancing policies with measures that aim to smooth out 
economic fluctuations and to bring about macroeconomic stability in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 According to OECD Statistics, final consumption expenditure of households in the United States was $9,742.5 
billion in current USD as of 2009. Five percent of which is $487 billion. 
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3. Sources of macroeconomic instability 
 
Empirical studies have identified numerous factors which may induce volatility in 
macroeconomic aggregates. These factors are of different nature, and I classify them 
henceforth under exogenous and endogenous factors. By these two terms I do not imply that 
they are “external” or “internal” factors in regard to the economy, but whether these factors 
can be controlled by the government and can be influenced by economic policies and 
structural reforms. I rely on the results of empirical studies in my approach to enlist the 
sources of volatility. A large part of these studies use econometric models and techniques to 
identify the causes of macroeconomic volatility. Nonetheless, other studies are based on the 
calibration of theoretical models (e.g. general equilibrium models, dynamic stochastic 
models, etc.) which I do not develop in detail, rather I focus directly on their estimation 
results. 
3.1. Exogenous factors 
(i) External and terms-of-trade shocks 
 
 External shocks have significant impact on macroeconomic instability in small open 
economies. Above all, the terms-of-trade shocks (fluctuations in the relative prices of exports 
to imports) are believed to be more pronounced because most small developing countries are 
price takers in international markets. Some of these countries have very low level of domestic 
production; not only low manufacturer output but also insufficient agricultural production. 
They are heavily dependent on imports; on imported capital goods, intermediate inputs, and 
on primary food and non-food commodities. Therefore, world price shocks affect these 
countries much severely. Moreover, these countries export only few primary commodities, 
and rely heavily on their export earnings for the payment of their large foreign debt services. 
Their export revenues are also highly unstable due to recurrent and sharp fluctuations in 
world demand and prices, which make these economies more and more vulnerable. Given 
such structural characteristics, it is easy to conclude that small open developing countries are 
much prone to external shocks, especially to shocks in their terms of trade.  
 Empirical studies have supported the fact that terms-of-trade shocks account for a 
significant portion of macroeconomic volatility in developing countries. Mendoza (1995) 
found that terms-of-trade disturbances explain 56 percent of output fluctuations in developing 
countries. Kose and Riezman (2001) estimate that terms-of-trade shocks account for almost 
half of the volatility in aggregate output in Africa. Kose (2002) modelled a small open 
economy under a dynamic stochastic model, and by using a variance decomposition method, 
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he estimated that “world price shocks account for a significant fraction of business cycle 
variability in developing countries.”  
Broda (2004) discriminated between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes in his 
study, and concluded that short-run real GDP volatility in response to terms-of-trade shocks 
is smaller in countries with flexible exchange rate regime (floating) than in those with fixed 
regime (pegs). He estimated that in developing countries, terms-of-trade disturbances explain 
30 percent of real GDP fluctuations in fixed exchange rate regimes compared to 10 percent in 
flexible exchange rate regimes. Although a few other studies have concluded that the level of 
impact of external shocks on output volatility might be lower (cf. Raddatz, 2007), 
nonetheless, there is no doubt that “exogenous volatility spillovers from abroad” are “a 
relevant determinant of output volatility” (Bandinger, 2010). 
 The principal transmitting channels of externals shocks are trade and financial 
integration. Countries more open to the world economy, which lack sufficient domestic 
production of primary commodities, tend to be more vulnerable to external shocks; given the 
fact that most of world price fluctuations occur in primary commodities, in both food and 
non-food (e.g. oil) items. Financial integration, on the other hand, makes countries more 
prone to global financial shocks, credit restraints, and world interest rate fluctuations. The 
level of specialisation of a country also plays an important role in determining the impact of 
external shocks. Countries more diversified, both in their export and production structures, 
will be able to decrease the negative effects of external shocks. These structural factors which 
determine the impact of external shocks over an economy will be discussed more in detail in 
section I.3.2. 
 The above arguments concerning external or terms-of-trade shocks were in two 
directions. On the demand side, large “importers” are more vulnerable because they do not 
have domestically-produced substitutes. And on the supply side, “specialized exporters” are 
also prone to the fluctuations in world commodity prices because they are price-takers at the 
global level. A special case in the latter category is the resource rich developing countries. 
Countries abundant in natural resources experience large volatilities especially in their fiscal 
indicators, because a large part of their revenues is based on their commodity exports. In 
periods of booming prices of commodities (e.g. oil), countries receive large surpluses and 
rents from their commodity exports. As Collier (2008) explains, in booming periods, they 
plan large investment projects for the short- and medium-run, and increase their government 
expenditures. But when the commodity prices fall, there is a sudden drop in fiscal revenue, 
and the government can no longer continuously finance its projects which are in the course of 
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implementation. Moreover, once the government increases its expenditures, it cannot easily 
reduce it back due to political and social constraints. Hence, in the periods of falling 
commodity prices, the resource-rich developing countries which do not have good fiscal 
management experience large fluctuations in their fiscal indicators (e.g. enlarging fiscal 
deficit, increasing tax rates, or decreasing public expenditures). Fiscal fluctuations will also 
cause volatility in other macroeconomic aggregates via the consumption channel, as 
households quickly adjust their behaviour to falling wages or decreasing employment. 
(ii) Supply-side shocks 
 
 Supply-side shocks, such as productivity or climatic shocks, contribute significantly 
to output volatility in developing countries. Hoffmaister and Roldós (1997) studied 
macroeconomic volatility in Asian and Latin American countries, and concluded that supply-
side shocks play a substantial role in explaining output volatility “even in the short-run.” 
Kose (2002) estimated that productivity shocks explain 10 to 20 percent of sectoral output 
volatility in small developing countries. 
 Agriculture-dependent countries which have not yet achieved a agricultural 
intensification are much vulnerable to climatic shocks. The irrigation system in these 
countries is not well developed, and their agricultural output is heavily dependent on climate 
conditions. Modified agricultural seeds which are flood-resistant and drought-tolerant are not 
widely used among the farmers. Therefore, climatic shocks, such as drought, flood or other 
natural disasters, have more adverse effect in these countries than in developed economies. 
(iii) Geography and market access 
 
Malik and Temple (2009) investigated the volatility effects of market access (proxied 
by coastal access), geographic predisposition to trade, climate variability, soil conditions, and 
ecological classifications of tropical location. They found an especially important role for 
market access: “remote countries are more likely to have undiversified exports and to 
experience greater volatility in output growth.” In fact, natural barriers to trade (such as being 
located far from international markets or having costly access to markets, for example, due to 
being landlocked and not having an easy access to sea) may lead countries to specialize in a 
narrow range of exports. This could explain the association in the cross-country data between 
coastal access, export concentration, exposure to world price shocks, and output volatility, as 
shown in Figure 1.7. Landlocked countries and/or countries with greater coastal distance tend 
to have more concentrated exports and thus experience higher volatility. Natural-resource 
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abundance is also associated with export concentration. Countries abundant with and 
dependent on point-source natural resources (such as fuels, minerals and plantation corps) 
have higher degree of exportation concentration, hence higher growth volatility.  
Malik and Temple’s (2009) argument is that geographic location influences the prices 
of intermediate inputs faced by domestic producers, and especially the prices of capital 
goods, due to high transportation costs. Output growth, thus, tends to be more volatile in 
countries situated in remote geographical areas. This phenomenon was confirmed in an 
earlier paper by Brunner et al. (2003) who showed that countries with higher trade costs may 
experience more volatile real exchange rate and volatile output growth. Malik and Temple 
(2009) also controlled for the countries’ institutions in their regressions and found that “even 
when conditioning on institutional variables, geographical characteristics continue to play an 
important role in explaining volatility.” 
Figure 1.7: Geographic location, specialisation, ToT volatility, and output volatility 
Source: Malik and Temple (2009) 
“A first look at the geography of output volatility. The top-right panel shows the well-known association 
between volatility and terms-of-trade volatility. Reading the remaining figures clockwise, volatility in the 
terms of trade is related to export concentration (lower-right) which is related to mean distance from the 
coast (lower left) and hence mean distance from the coast and output volatility are positively associated (top-
left). The solid line is a least-squares fit, the dashed line a robust (least trimmed squares) fit.” (description by 
the authors) 
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(iv) Social fragmentation 
 
Rodrik (1999) studied the question that ‘why some economies were hardly affected by 
the volatility in their external environment during the second half of the 1970s, while others 
suffered extensively for a decade or more before starting to recover.’ To answer this, he 
advanced the hypothesis that domestic social conflicts are key to understanding this 
phenomenon. He emphasized that “social conflicts interact with external shocks on the one 
hand and the domestic institutions of conflict management on the other.” These interactions 
play a central role in determining an economy’s response to volatility in the external 
environment. “When social divisions run deep and the institutions of conflict management 
are weak, the economic costs of exogenous shocks – such as deteriorations in the terms of 
trade – are magnified by the distributional conflicts that are triggered.” In fact, social 
divisions generate uncertainty in the economic environment, and delay the required 
adjustments to correct the disequilibria created in the economy. Policy-makers who belong to 
different ethnic groups will not be able to reach an agreement on bringing necessary 
structural reforms, or to take effective measures to respond to external shocks. Hence, 
countries which suffer from social divisions experience stronger volatility effects.  
In a complementary but independent study, Tornell and Lane (1999) analysed an 
economy characterised by weak legal-political institutional infrastructure and by 
“fractionalization” inside the government elite. They focused on a fiscal process in which 
powerful groups dynamically interact and maintain discretionary fiscal redistribution to 
allocate national resources for themselves. “In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic 
growth and a “voracity effect,” by which a shock, such as terms of trade windfall, perversely 
generates a more-than-proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth.” 
The authors also note that the governments of such countries would respond in the same 
perverse fashion even in the case of favourable shocks, by increasing more than 
proportionally fiscal redistribution and investing in inefficient capital projects. They explain 
that in a society in which non-cooperative powerful groups exist, the “redistributive struggle” 
between them will result in a greater share of resources being invested in non-taxable 
inefficient activities. In fact, when groups have the power to extract fiscal transfers, due to 
lack of institutional barriers, such redistributional transfers would be invested in shadow 
sectors in order to protect their profits from arbitrary taxation.  
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 (v) Aid volatility 
 
Volatile aid inflows, too, can be a source of macroeconomic volatility in low-income 
countries (LICs), especially when aid is in the form of budget support rather than project 
support. Empirical studies have found that aid flows are usually volatile and pro-cyclical 
(Pallage and Robe, 2001) and such volatile pattern in aid inflows can have significant 
negative impact on the variability of macroeconomic aggregates through fiscal indicators. 
Aid is observed to be more volatile than domestic revenues, and is rarely stabilizing. In fact, 
“unpredictable and procyclical aid can heighten the overall macroeconomic instability” (Bulíř 
and Hamann, 2008). Arellano et al. (2009) argue that aid volatility induces strong fluctuations 
in consumption, investment and real exchange rates. They explained that even in the absence 
of aid, large productivity fluctuations typical of aid-dependent countries introduce high 
volatility in all macroeconomic aggregates. And when the country receives foreign 
assistance, aid volatility further exacerbates these macroeconomic fluctuations.  
The above arguments focus only on volatile aid flows. Nevertheless, economists have 
also emphasised that large aid inflows, in general, can have “Dutch disease” effects. Foreign 
aid is partially spent on nontradable goods, and, as a consequence, domestic prices increase, 
which leads to a real exchange rate appreciation. In turn, factors of production (including 
labour) will be re-allocated to the nontradable goods sector, which will result in a decline in 
the output of tradable sector compared to the output of nontradable sector. Export 
competitiveness will deteriorate and it will have an adverse effect on growth (Agénor, 2004). 
Thus, foreign aid contributes to macroeconomic instability by appreciating the real exchange 
rate, and enlarging the trade deficit. Furthermore, foreign aid may damage fiscal 
sustainability of the recipient country, by decreasing the incentives to implement fiscal and 
tax reforms. It also weakens macroeconomic stability through “shifting political attention at 
the margin towards the creation of an ‘enabling environment for aid’ which may not be the 
same thing as enabling environment for sustainable private sector led growth” (DFID, 2004). 
Government will focus on effective management and efficient allocation of foreign aid in the 
country, and will divert its attention from seeking potential sources of long-term stable 
growth. Hence, foreign aid affects macroeconomic stability by weakening the institutional 
capacities which ensure sustainable growth. 
3.2. Endogenous factors 
 
 Classifying the sources of macroeconomic volatility as exogenous and endogenous 
factors is, in a way, “imperfect.” Although various factors explained in the earlier section 
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seem to be exogenous – meaning they cannot be controlled or influenced by the government 
– but, in the long-run, they turn out to be endogenous. For example, although can be treated 
as exogenous, “exposure to terms-of-trade shocks depends on import and export structures, 
which are endogenous in the long-run” (Malik and Temple, 2009). The government can 
modify its trade structure in the long-run by implementing necessary structural reforms or by 
diversifying its export structure, and, as a result, decrease the economy’s exposure to external 
shocks. The degree of exposure to shocks (whether external or internal) are thus a function of 
an economy’s structural characteristics and are partly determined by the complex effects that 
a choice of policy regime – although subjected to constraints in the economy – may have in 
the long-run. It also relates to the manner in which economic agents cope with the shocks. In 
fact, vulnerability to aggregate shocks is determined by the extent to which individually 
rational actions of firms and households, and the policy intervention of governments, add up 
to collective behaviour which whether responds effectively to these shocks and brings the 
economy back to the equilibrium, or not. In this context, “the shocks themselves are, to some 
extent at least, endogenous” (Easterly et al. 2000). 
 We now turn to the factors which are conceived to be directly endogenous, at least in 
the medium-run. There has been extensive research recently on the fact that the impact of 
external shocks is determined by the country’s own structural characteristics. The underlying 
idea is to verify whether a country’s vulnerability to shocks is not purely random but linked 
to the domestic conditions (Loayza and Raddatz, 2006). In this section, we will look over the 
concerning structural characteristics that are believed to influence the impact of shocks on the 
real economy. 
(i) Financial integration and depth 
 
There has been a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies on how financial 
development and liberalisation affects macroeconomic stability. There is general consensus 
that financial deepening1 reduces macroeconomic instability, while there is no unique 
agreement on the impact of financial integration on macroeconomic instability.  
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) proposed a framework for analysing the role 
of financial development and integration as a source of instability in small open economies. 
They showed that “economies at an intermediate level of financial development are more 
unstable than either very developed or very underdeveloped economies.” Temporary shocks 
in countries with intermediate level of financial depth will have larger and more persistent 
                                                
1 Technically, financial deepening (or depth) refers to seeking a positive real growth for the financial sector; i.e. 
growth in the share of liquid assets to GDP. 
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effects on the real economy. The authors explain that: at very high levels of financial 
development, most firms’ investment is not constrained by cash flow, so shocks to cash flow 
are irrelevant. On the other hand, at very low levels of financial development, firms cannot 
borrow enough in any case and therefore their response to cash-flow shocks will be rather 
muted. Shocks will, therefore, die out without causing any great turmoil. It is then at 
intermediate levels of financial development that shocks to cash flow will have an effect to be 
intense enough to cause instability.  
The assessments made in the earlier paragraph do not suggest, however, that countries 
which are at their early stage of financial developed are totally safe from the adverse effects 
of temporary shocks to financial sector. In fact, in countries with serious capital market 
imperfections, where investors have unequal access to capital and to investment 
opportunities, endogenous and permanent fluctuations are likely to appear in aggregate GDP, 
investment, and interest rates (Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty, 1999). Economies with less 
developed financial sector and more capital market imperfections tend to grow more slowly 
and fluctuate around their steady-state growth path – in other words, experience more growth 
volatility. 
Concerning financial integration, Aghion and Banerjee (2005) emphasized that in 
countries at intermediate level of financial development “an unrestricted financial 
liberalization may actually destabilize the economy” and engender volatility in the short-run 
that would otherwise not have happened. Thus, fully liberalising the capital account may not 
be a good idea at least until the domestic financial sector is sufficiently well developed. 
Agénor and Montiel (2008), as well, agree that “greater integration with international 
financial markets exposes many middle-income countries to abrupt reversals in capital flows, 
which may exacerbate macroeconomic volatility.” 
However, Loayza and Raddatz (2006) found ambiguous results on the impact of 
financial opening and depth on macroeconomic stability. They found that financial 
integration reduces the impact of external shocks, while domestic financial depth has a more 
nuanced role in stabilizing the economy. But when they allowed for the interaction between 
financial development and financial openness in their model, they found that financial 
development reduces the impact of external shocks only in countries with higher financial 
integration, but will have an opposite effect when financial openness is low. This result 
shows a complementarity between bringing reforms in domestic financial system and seeking 
more financial integration. The authors concluded that “higher financial openness in an 
environment of underdeveloped local financial markets may result in an increase in the 
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impact of external shocks. In contrast, when financial openness occurs in a country with well 
developed financial markets, the impact of the shocks is reduced.”  
(ii) Trade openness 
 
Loayza and Raddatz (2006) found that larger trade openness magnifies the output 
impact of external shocks, particularly the negative ones. They observed that “larger trade 
openness appears to increase the cumulative impact of terms-of-trade shocks.” More trade 
openness means larger trade volume and, in turn, translates into a magnifying mechanism for 
terms-of-trade shocks. The authors estimated that the output impact of a one-standard-
deviation terms-of-trade shock is 1.4 percentage point higher at the third quartile of trade 
openness than at the first quartile. Nevertheless, the impact is considerably smaller when the 
expansion in openness occurs in a country with well developed local financial markets. Kose 
et al. (2006) affirmed that “in a regression of growth on volatility and other controls, the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction between volatility and trade integration is 
significantly positive.” 
Giovanni and Levchenko (2006) studied an industry-level panel dataset of 59 
countries, with 28 manufacturing sectors, over the period 1970-99, and analysed the 
mechanisms through which trade can affect the volatility of production. They found that trade 
openness is positively correlated with volatility at the industry level. Once exports and 
imports are treated separately, their results show that importing in a sector increases volatility 
more than exporting. Quantitatively, they estimated that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
trade openness raises aggregate volatility by about 15 percent of the average aggregate 
variance. In fact, when an economy is open to international trade, an industry is more 
vulnerable to world supply and demand shocks. Trade openness increases overall volatility 
because it leads to specialization and thus a less diversified production structure. 
In a distinct approach, Razin et al. (2003) evaluated the impact of trade openness 
through the adjustment costs of investment. They emphasized that, in the presence of 
economies of scale trade, openness may cause volatility in the setup cost of investment, 
through changes in the terms of trade, and thereby may generate instability in the form of 
“boom-bust investment cycles,” supported by self-fulfilling expectations. In a period of 
‘good’ terms of trade with lower setup costs of investment, the country will experience a 
boom in the investment cycle, while in a period of ‘bad’ terms of trade the investment cycle 
will see a decline due to increasing higher setup costs. In developing countries, firms face 
relatively higher setup costs due to inadequate infrastructure (communication, transportation, 
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etc.) and scarce skilled labour. Trade openness in such countries will, thus, generate more 
pronounced oscillations in the investment cycles, compared to developed countries. 
(iii) Diversification 
 
 The trade structure of a country plays a major role in transmitting external shocks, 
especially the terms-of-trade shocks; it can whether amplify or downplay their effects. Many 
economists have emphasized that less diversified economies face higher risk of external 
shocks (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Koren and Tenreyro, 2006, 2007; Stiglitz et al., 2006; 
Giovanni and Levchenko, 2006; Malik and Temple, 2009; Haddad et al., 2010). External 
shocks can affect an economy through both exports and imports. On the one hand, exporting 
countries with higher specialization and higher concentration in their exports depend heavily 
on the revenue gains from their few exporting items (whether primary or manufactured 
goods). In this case, a drop in world prices (or in world demand) will severely affect their 
economies: a decline in production and employment, and a possible drop in fiscal revenues. 
On the other hand, countries which do not have sufficient domestic production and rely 
heavily on imported intermediate and final goods to satisfy their domestic demand are also 
much vulnerable. An increase in world prices will strongly affect their economies through 
generating inflation and decreasing the purchasing power of the households. Therefore, we 
are not only concerned with the level of diversification in the export structure but also in the 
economy’s production structure. Less diversified economies are faced with higher uncertainty 
and risk, and suffer from higher welfare losses following a shock to their external 
environment. In contrast, higher diversification will minimise the risks of and vulnerability to 
external shocks. 
Haddad et al. (2010) noted that the effect of trade openness on growth volatility 
reduces with the degree of export diversification, both across products and markets. 
According to them, not only product diversification (number of goods exported) but also 
market diversification (number of destination markets) play an important role in moderating 
the volatility effects of trade openness on growth. Malik and Temple (2009) found that terms-
of-trade volatility is strongly associated with a lack of export diversification, which is shown 
in Figure 1.7, the bottom right panel. Giovanni and Levchenko (2006) explained that “some 
countries specialize systematically in more or less risky sectors.” They studied the risk 
content of a country’s export pattern and estimated that increased specialization contributes 
by 7.5 percent in output volatility. 
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 In a pioneering paper, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), henceforth AZ, using a neo-
classical growth model augmented with micro-level uncertainties and non-convexities 
showed that less developed economies are more volatile because they are unable to diversify 
idiosyncratic risks. At the early stages of development, owing to the scarcity of capital and to 
the fact that a large number of undertaken projects is subject to indivisibilities in the form 
start-up costs, countries can only finance a limited number of projects and invest in safer but 
less productive sectors. This drawback limits the scope for risk diversification in these 
economies and will make their earlier stages of development highly random and uncertain. 
The main idea in AZ model is that, in fact, “better diversification opportunities enable a 
gradual allocation of fund to their most productive uses while reducing the variability of 
growth.” The process of development in the AZ model goes through several stages: first, a 
lengthy period of “primitive accumulation” with highly volatile output; second, a take-off 
phase with stronger financial deepening which widens the scope for diversification; and 
finally, a developed phase with a steady growth. 
 Koren and Tenreyro (2006) developed an endogenous growth model of “technological 
diversification” to explain output volatility in the early stages of development. The key idea 
in their model is that, as production uses different inputs which are subject to imperfectly 
correlated shocks, “firms using a larger variety of inputs can mitigate the impact of shocks 
affecting the productivity of individual inputs.” In fact, countries accumulate new inputs as 
they develop, and more input varieties will be directed towards sectors in which they have a 
comparative advantage. This makes sectoral output less volatile and reduces volatility in the 
aggregate level. Thus technological progress instinctively decreases growth volatility. In a 
second paper, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) decomposed aggregate volatility in three 
components: sectoral shocks, country-specific shocks, and country-sector covariance shocks. 
They argued that poor countries are more volatile because they specialise in fewer and more 
volatile sectors which carry high sector-specific risks. Almost 50 percent of the differences in 
volatility between poor and rich countries can be accounted for by difference in the sectoral 
composition of the economy (higher concentration and sectoral risk). 
(iv) Distortionary macroeconomic policies and policy instability 
 
 Various studies have found that distortionary macroeconomic policies (such as pro-
cyclical fiscal policy, distorted foreign exchange market, etc.), economic mismanagement 
(such as large budget deficits, inefficient monetary policy to contain inflation, unsustainable 
external position, etc.), and policy instability contribute to macroeconomic volatility (Fischer, 
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1993; Bleaney, 1996; Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2000; Fatás, 2005; Loayza and Raddatz, 
2006; Raddatz, 2007; Loayza et al., 2007). 
 However, some economists are sceptical that macroeconomic policies can have a 
determining effect on macroeconomic stability (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Easterly, 2005). 
According to the latter, distortionary macroeconomic policies are more likely to be the 
“symptoms of weak institutions” rather than the main causes of economic volatility. Once 
institutions are controlled for in the regressions, macroeconomic policies turn out to be 
having insignificant effect on macroeconomic volatility. Fatás (2005) while confirming the 
latter viewpoint maintains, however, that only policy volatility has a determinant effect on 
macroeconomic performance. It is not the levels of policy variables, but in fact it is the 
volatility in policy variables which affects growth stability. 
(v) Weak institutions 
 
 Recent studies have argued that institutions play a larger role in enhancing 
macroeconomic stability than what previously thought. In fact, institutions interact with 
external and exogenous shocks and determine the magnitude of their impact on various 
macroeconomic variables. Strong and efficient institutions create risk-management 
mechanisms against exogenous and external shocks, and reduce their negative impact on the 
economy. However, when institutions are weak, the volatility impact of exogenous shocks is 
magnified by the distributional conflicts that are triggered in the society (Rodrik, 1999). 
Therefore, the weaker the institutions, the larger the effect of shocks on the economy. Weak 
institutions may refer to poor rule of law, political institutions that do not constrain politicians 
and political elites from rent-seeking or from expropriating the resources, ineffective 
enforcement of property rights for investors, widespread corruption, ineffective judiciary 
system, high degree of political instability, non-democratic rights, absence of or inefficient 
social safety nets, etc.  
In an influential paper, Acemoglu et al. (2003) sought to document a relationship 
between the historically determined component of post-war institutions and volatility. They 
argued that “countries that inherited worse (‘extractive’) institutions from European colonial 
power are much more likely to experience high volatility and severe economic crises.” 
Countries with poor institutions not only grow slower in the long-run, but also experience 
greater volatility and other worse macroeconomic outcomes. One of the main arguments in 
their paper is that: 
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“… standard macroeconomic variables, often blamed for economic crises and volatility, 
play a relatively minor role. … These macroeconomic variables, with the possible 
exception of exchange rate misalignment, do not appear to be a major mediating channel 
through which institutions affect economic outcomes. Weak institutions appear to create 
macroeconomic problems via a variety of microeconomic as well as macroeconomic 
channels.” 
  In fact, in institutionally weak societies, elites and politicians will find various ways 
of “expropriation” of resources, ranging from microeconomic to macroeconomic instruments. 
In such societies, economic cooperation is based on “trust,” and contractual agreements are 
more imperfect. Shocks, in this case, may make it impossible to sustain cooperation and will 
lead to output collapses. Furthermore, with weak institutions, entrepreneurs may choose 
sectors or activities from which they can withdraw their capital more quickly following a 
perceived shock, thus further contributing to the economic instability. 
Unlike Rodrik’s (1999) thesis according to which institutions interact with exogenous 
shocks to then determine the nature and magnitude of their impact on the variability of 
macroeconomic indicators, Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that the proximate affecting channel 
between institutions and volatility is not primarily the propensity of institutionally-weak 
societies to run into crises during the periods of global recession, “instead it is likely that it is 
the inability of institutionally weak societies to deal with their own idiosyncratic economic 
and most likely political problems that underlies their economic instability” (emphasis by the 
authors). 
 Other empirical studies have also identified strong relationships between institutions 
and economic volatility. Malik and Temple (2009) observed that “countries with weaker 
institutions tend to be more volatile.” They concluded that “geography and institutions are 
both important. Once combined, they can explain as much as two-thirds of the international 
variation in volatility.” Klomp and de Haan (2009) examined the effect of political 
institutions on economic growth volatility and found that “democracy reduces economic 
volatility”, while “some dimensions of political instability and policy uncertainty increase 
economic volatility.” Tang et al. (2008) identified technological progress (“technical 
change”) as a mediating channel between institutions and macroeconomic volatility. The 
authors explain that technological progress is an important stabilizing force of 
macroeconomic volatility, and at least part of the stabilizing force of technical change 
originates from strong institutions. 
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 (vi) Microeconomic rigidities 
 
 Modern macroeconomics (i.e. New Keynesian macroeconomics) is based on 
competitive equilibrium models in which microeconomic foundations (such as imperfect 
competition, price rigidity, real wage rigidity, credit rationing, etc.) have been introduced. 
According to this latest theory and literature, fluctuations in output are generated by changes 
in inputs (e.g. labour or capital) or in prices of inputs (e.g. wage or prices) or in technology. 
However, empirical studies have given mixed results in support of these theoretical models. 
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) – while comparing OECD and low-income countries – 
found “neither evidence for those who claim that wage-price rigidity is the problem causing 
fluctuations, nor for those who argue that wage-price volatility increases output volatility 
through demand effects.” A possible explanation is that there are demand effects of wage 
adjustments, and the adverse effects of these may offset the positive effects arising from 
wage flexibility. Nonetheless, if the explanations of these theoretical models for output 
fluctuation are based on price and real wage rigidity, then these models fail to explain why 
output in LICs is more volatile than that in advanced economies, yet real wages are more 
flexible in the former (Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2000). 
Some empirical studies by economists at the World Bank have found that 
microeconomic regulations hamper adjustment to shocks by restricting the economy’s ability 
to reallocate resources in response. Microeconomic regulations such as product market, 
labour and fiscal regulations lead to higher macroeconomic volatility (Loayza et al., 2004). 
Similarly, improvements in market labour flexibility reduce the impact of terms-of-trade 
shocks on per capita income. In this case, “the ability of firms to adjust their activities on the 
labor margin seems crucial for the economy to accommodate the shock” (Loayza and 
Raddatz, 2006). 
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4. Macroeconomic instability and development 
 
In the previous section, we looked at various potential sources of macroeconomic 
instability, both internal and external sources, and we examined how these “exogenous” 
factors interact with the structural factors in the economy to induce and exacerbate 
macroeconomic volatility. In fact, these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and may 
interact in various ways. Figure 1.8 illustrates the interactions and links among different 
factors which induce macroeconomic volatility. The effects of external (such as terms-of-
trade shocks or aid volatility) and internal shocks (such as climatic shock or productivity 
shocks) are determined by the structural features of the economy which act as a risk-
management mechanism. Well-developed financial sector, well-managed capital-account 
liberalization, higher export and production diversification, lower market-access costs, strong 
and efficient institutions, and “good” policies may decrease the negative effects of exogenous 
shocks. Hence, at early stages of development, countries normally have underdeveloped 
structures, and this allows for the exogenous shocks to generate strong oscillations in the 
macroeconomic variables. As countries advance in their development path and acquire the 
structural characteristics mentioned earlier, exogenous shocks will leave less impact on the 
economy, and the macroeconomic environment becomes more and more stable. 
 As outlined in the earlier sections, macroeconomic instability is an endemic 
phenomenon in developing countries. It has become a first-order issue of interest in 
development macroeconomics in recent years. But is macroeconomic instability a source of 
underdevelopment or is it a permanent feature of poor countries? Because what matters to the 
researchers in the field of development economics is to be able to identify the causes of 
macroeconomic volatility and to define the nature of interaction between macroeconomic 
instability and underdevelopment, so that policy-makers in developing countries, in their turn, 
could influence their macroeconomic environment by adopting relevant strategies, policies 
and instruments. 
The answer to this question is that macroeconomic instability is both a source and a 
reflection of underdevelopment. On the one hand, when macroeconomic instability is not 
promptly overhauled, it holds the country back in underdevelopment as it will not allow for 
an enabling environment for long-term stable growth which is a necessary condition for 
development and poverty reduction. In the presence of macroeconomic instability, the 
country will not be able to exploit efficiently its potentials for sustainable growth, and 
economic agents will not be encouraged to engage in productive long-term activities and 
investments. Furthermore, macroeconomic instability will push the economy into a series of 
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economic crises which will allocate resources in the economy for ‘exit strategies from crises’ 
instead of allocating them for efficient development strategies. On the other hand, 
macroeconomic instability is a product and a feature of underdevelopment, too. As stated 
earlier, countries experience macroeconomic instability at their early stages of development. 
Macroeconomic instability is the result of co-existence of various ‘underdeveloped 
structures’ in the economy. Until these underdeveloped structures, such as weak institutions, 
market distortions, financial underdevelopment and undiversified production and trade 
structures, exist in the economy and are not tackled properly, macroeconomic instability is a 
long-lasting phenomenon.  
At the policy-making level, the recognition of this idea has important implications. On 
the one hand, it implies that an important part of the strategy to get a country out of 
underdevelopment should be to deal seriously with the existing macroeconomic instability in 
the country. Possessing a stable macroeconomic environment is a necessary condition for the 
Figure 1.8: Conceptual Framework 
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effectiveness of development policies. On the other hand, it also implies that macroeconomic 
instability cannot be tackled immediately and the outcome of adopted policies can only be 
observed in the long-term. All short-term stabilisation policies aimed at improving 
macroeconomic instability are, in fact, aimed at shortening the period of instability instead of 
avoiding it. Therefore, short-term stabilisation policies aimed at influencing macroeconomic 
instability must be accompanied with long-term structural and development policies. Only 
with a mix of development, structural and stabilisation policies can the government install 
macroeconomic stability in the country. Adopting uniquely stabilisation policies will have no 
long-run effect as it only fixes the disequilibria temporarily, and shocks will regenerate after 
a certain period. 
Hence, the second part of this dissertation will present a practical methodology on 
how to choose the ‘right’ and effective policies and strategies to correct macroeconomic 
instability in a country.  
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Figure 2.1: GDP per capita since 1970 
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Part II. Case study: Afghanistan 
 
 In this part, I will study macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan. My approach will 
be of a diagnostic one. First, I will identify the causes and sources of instability in 
Afghanistan, and secondly I will propose a series of policies and structural reforms in order to 
overcome macroeconomic instability and to stabilise the economy. 
1. The Afghan economy 
1.1. Recent economic history 
 
 Until the end of the Second World War, the Afghan economy was oriented around the 
private sector and was relatively unregulated. However, between 1950s and 1990s the 
economic system was defined as a centrally-planned economy. The economy started to be 
further regulated and planified under the administration of Mohammad Daoud Khan (1953-
1963 as Prime Minister, and 1973-1978 as President), and moved towards a socialist system 
in the subsequent years of communist regime till 1992. The civil war started in 1979 with the 
Soviet invasion (1979-1989) and ended with the fall of Taliban in 2001. Over twenty years of 
civil conflict and political crisis affected severely the physical, institutional, social and 
economic structures in the country. Although, even prior to the civil war, Afghanistan was 
one of the low-income 
countries in the world, its 
GDP per capita in 1979 
stood higher than that in 
2004 (see Figure 2.1). 
Only in 2005 had 
Afghanistan succeeded to 
attain its pre-war level of 
per capita income.  
Table 2.1 makes a 
regional comparison of 
GDP per capita between 
1960 and 2009. An 
interesting fact to note is 
that Afghanistan’s GDP 
per capita in 1978 was 
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slightly higher than that of India and Pakistan. Thirty years later, it is now almost half of what 
it is in Pakistan and in India. This shows the extent to which civil war and political crisis have 
cost Afghanistan in terms of economic development and how much it has to catch up with 
other countries.  
Table 2.1: Regional comparison of GDP per capita 
 1960 1970 1975 1978 1980 2002 2009 
Afghanistan 55.92  147.71  177.56  230.06  241.76  174.61  485.95  
Pakistan 80.85  165.44  159.64  228.51  286.35  499.00  954.52  
India 84.18  111.76  158.12  206.07  267.41  483.66  1,192.08  
Iran -  372.44  1,473.89  1,997.97  2,301.43  1,763.58  4,540.43  
In current US dollars; Source: WDI 
 
The trade and fiscal deficits widened dramatically during the war. Trade deficit which 
was 6.3 percent of GDP in 19711 soared to more than 50 percent in 2003. Fiscal deficit 
excluding foreign grants, which stood at 4.3 percent of GDP in 1973,
2
 more than doubled to 
10 percent of GDP in 2003. At least domestic revenues covered the entire operating 
expenditures before the civil war, and only part of the development budget was financed by 
foreign borrowing and grants. After the war in 2003, domestic revenues financed less than 50 
percent of current expenditures. In addition, by late 1970s Afghanistan had attained its food 
                                                
1 Author’s calculations based on data provided by Fry (1974) 
2 Author’s calculations based on data provided by Fry (1974) 
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self-sufficiency (Nyrop and Seekins, 1986), whilst it had a total cereal deficit of 440,000 
metric tonnes in 2005. 
 Economic growth in the pre-war period was modest and extremely volatile. The 
economy grew at an average rate of 2.5 percent over the period 1950-1979, and then entered 
into recession during the subsequent years of war. Contractions in real GDP occurred in each 
4 or 5 years, caused by drought or political shocks. Table 2.2 shows the average growth rate 
for each decade from various sources. Since 2002, the economy has grown at a remarkable 
pace; the average growth rate has been well above 10 percent. As to inflation, the level of 
prices skyrocketed during the years of war, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, due to 
decreased food supply and depreciated exchange rate. Figure 2.2 illustrates the implicit GDP 
deflator – which is the Paasche Price Index – in logarithmic form over the period 1970-2009. 
As shown in the graph, the price index jumped between 1993 and 2001; it rose from an index 
of 0.10 to 131.81.    
Although calculating the annual change in Paasche Price Index or GDP deflator is not 
an accurate estimator of inflation because it reflects changes not only in price but also in 
volume, nevertheless, the average annual inflation (based on Paasche Price Index) between 
1993 and 2001 was more than 300 percent. Consequent to rising inflation, the exchange rate 
depreciated significantly. In September 1975, the average free market exchange rate of 
Afghani against the US dollar was 55 Afs.1 while it reached 33,790 Afs. after the fall of 
Taliban in December 2001. Due to huge transaction costs, the new Afghani was effectively 
introduced in January 2003, replacing the old Afghani per thousand units.  
Table 2.2: Average growth rates 
 
Fry (1974) 
Maddison 
(2003) 
UNSD Penn WT 
1940-50 -1.7    
1950-59 2.6 3.3   
1960-69 2.6 2.1   
1970-79  2.3 1.9 1.9 
1980-89  -1.2 -1.5 -1.5 
1990-2000  4.1 -1.2 1.1 
2000-09   16.5 12.9 
1.2. The economy since 2002 
 
 Subsequent to the political shift in 2002 and the adoption of a new constitution in 
2004, the Afghan economy also entered a structural change. The new constitution 
acknowledged ‘market economy’ as the economic system and guaranteed the promotion and 
                                                
1 Source: World Bank (1975) 
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protection of private investment (Article 10 of the Constitution). The economy has since been 
highly liberalized and the government has focused on a private sector-led growth. 
Afghanistan remains one of the most open economies to trade and investment among the 
LICs. It has the lowest tariff rates in the region, both among the South Asian and Central 
Asian countries, as illustrated in Table 2.3. Since 2002 the government has tried to lower the 
tariff and legal trade barriers, and this process was intensified after it agreed in 2006 to 
receive financial support from the IMF under the PRGF (Poverty Reduction, Growth 
Facilitation) programme through 2010. There remains, however, a wide range of technical 
barriers to trade such as lack of infrastructure, transport, market access and information, 
which can only be eliminated over a long period with public-private partnership. Being a 
landlocked country, Afghanistan has chosen to move towards trade integration with regional 
economies. It is now a member of regional economic cooperation organisations such as 
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and ECO (Economic 
Cooperation Organization), and has signed SAARC’s Agreement on SAFTA (South Asian 
Free Trade Area) in 2008. 
Table 2.3: Degree of openness and Tariff rates in the region 
 
Openness 
Average applied 
tariff rate 
Maximum 
duty applied 
No. of MFN 
applied tariff lines 
Afghanistan 61.7 5.6 40 5,207 
India 45.8 12.8 246 11,360 
Iran 43.7 26 400 6,649 
Pakistan 38.1 13.9 100 6,802 
Tajikistan 73.1 7.9 332 11,176 
Turkmenistan 111.9 … … … 
Uzbekistan 72.9 15.9 787 10,985 
Sources: PENN WT (for openness) and WTO Tariff Profiles 2010 (for other indicators) 
Note: All data is as of 2009, with the exception of tariff-related indicators for 
“Afghanistan” which are as of 2008. 
 
Under IMF’s PRGF programme, now named ECF (Extended Credit Facility), an early 
vague of privatisation was carried out. Three state-owned banks were liquidated and seven 
other state-owned banks and public enterprises were partially or totally restructured in order 
to be possibly privatised in the future.1 Nevertheless, the Afghan economy remains less 
regulated and the private sector has grown remarkably since 2002. In fact, more than two 
decades of war already eliminated the regulatory structures and mechanisms in the economy, 
as one author puts it, “the Afghan economy is largely unregulated and informal – there does 
                                                
1 Liquidated banks were Agricultural Development Bank, Industrial Development Bank and Mortgage 
Construction Bank. Re-structured banks and enterprises are Bank-e Milli, Pashtanay Commercial Bank, Export 
Promotion Bank, DABM/S (the Afghan electricity enterprise), FLGE (Fuel and Liquid Gas Enterprise), Afghan 
Telecom, and Ariana Afghan Airlines. 
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not seem to be much left that could be liberalized or privatized in the failed state of 
Afghanistan” (Weinbaum, 2007). 
As shown in Table 2.4, the economy has grown at a remarkable pace since 2002, 
despite the fact that the growth rate has been extremely volatile. The geometric mean of 
economic growth over the period 2003-2010 is 10.6 percent, which is a remarkable 
achievement despite serious security challenges. Agriculture is the dominant output sector. 
Although the share of agriculture sector has dropped from 45.2 percent of GDP in 2002 to 
32.5 percent in 2009, it is still larger than the industries sector which makes 22.1 percent of 
GDP (see Figure 2.3). Furthermore, it is estimated that 59 percent of employed Afghan 
population is engaged in the agriculture or livestock (NRVA, 2009). Some sources maintain 
that more than 80 percent of households depend in some way on income received from 
agriculture-related activities. Inflation has been on average above 10 percent in the last eight 
years; the average inflation rate for the period 2003-2010 is 11.4 percent. However, this does 
not seem to have been a drag on economic growth. 
 
 
Data source: Central Statistics Office 
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Figure 2.3: Sectoral composition of GDP and its evolution 
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Table 2.4: Main economic indicators for the period 2003-2010  
  1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 
  2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Output (in percent, unless otherwise indicated) 
Real GDP growth 15.1 9.4 16.4 8.2 14.2 3.4 20.4 8.2 
Nominal GDP (million US$) 
b
 4,766  5,704  6,815  7,722  9,739  11,757  14,483  16,959  
GDP per capita (current US$) 
b
 187  218  254  281  345  405  486  556  
GDP per capita, PPP (current inter. $) 
b
 659  723  835  933  938  955  1,321    
Prices (in percent) 
CPI Inflation (period average) 
a
 24.1 12.8 12.3 5.2 12.9 26.8 -12.2 8.9 
CPI Inflation (end of period) 
a
 10.3 14.9 9.5 4.8 20.7 3.2 -5.1 16.6 
Core inflation (excl. cereals & energy; p.a.) 
a
    11.8 6.7 5.1 10.2 3.1 8.8 
Fiscal sector (in percent of GDP) 
Domestic revenues 4.7 5 6.4 7.5 6.9 6.9 9 9.8 
Foreign grants 6.7 9 11.2 9.3 11 8.7 8.9 11.1 
Expenditures 14.5 15.3 16.6 19.6 19.7 19.3 19.1 20.8 
Overall balance (incl. grants) -3.1 -1.4 1 -2.9 -1.8 -3.7 -1.2 0.1 
Overall balance (excl. grants) -9.8 -10.4 -10.2 -12.2 -12.8 -12.4 -10.1 -11 
External sector (in percent of GDP) 
Exports of goods 39.7 28.8 26.3 23.5 18.8 18.6 17.0 16.2 
Imports of goods 91.9 89.2 90.0 87.3 80.5 74.7 60.4 53.5 
Trade balance -52.2 -60.4 -63.6 -63.9 -61.6 -56.2 -43.4 -37.3 
Current account balance -10.0 -4.4 -2.8 -4.9 1.2 -0.9 -3.6 1.9 
FDI 1.3 3.1 4.2 3.1 2.5 2.5 1.4 1.3 
External debt     184.2 155.0 20.7 17.5 11.2 7.6 
  (in percent, unless otherwise indicated) 
Commercial lending interest rate 
a
       18.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Exchange rate (Af. per USD) 
a
 49.0 47.8 49.6 49.9 49.8 51.0 49.3 45.8 
REER (percentage change) 
e
 -11.3 10.1 3.2 -0.2 5.5 21.6 -12.0 9.3 
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  1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 
  2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Unemployment 
c
     7.0     
Employment rate (% of working-age pop.) 
c
     61.9     
Poverty headcount rate 
c
     36.0     
Poverty gap ratio 
c
     7.9     
GINI Index 
c
     29.0     
Ratio R/P 20% 
c
     4.3     
Human Development Index 
d
     0.307   0.311    0.307    0.327    0.342   0.349 
Sources: a: DAB; b: WDI; c: NRVA (2009); d: UNDP; e: Author's calculation; For the rest of the series: IMF 
Notes: Values in italics indicate estimates by their respective sources; Underlined values indicate estimates by author; Data on output excludes the drug economy; 
Exports include official and smuggled exports but exclude the export of opium and drugs; Trade statistics include both official records of and smuggled trade; R/P 20% 
refers to the ratio of average income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% (calculated by author based on NRVA data);  
REER (Real effective exchange rate) is calculated by the author using Afghani's exchange rate vis-à-vis the most widely exchanged currencies in Kabul's money 
bazaar (i.e. US Dollar, Pakistani Rupee, Indian Rupee, Euro and Iranian Ryal). The weights used for these currencies are based on the average share of their 
respective countries' trade with Afghanistan over the period 2002-2009: US$ (49%), Pak Rs. (24.5%), Indian Rs. (12.6%), Euro (11.7%) and Iranian Ryal (2.2%). The 
weight for US$ is obtained as a residual after deducting the trade share of the four latter countries -- it is the average share of the Rest Of the World. The data on trade 
shares is obtained from UNCTAD Statistics; 
Financial year starts according to the official Afghan calendar (i.e. Persian calendar of Solar Hijri). SH year starts March 21. For example, the year 1389 corresponds 
to Mar 21, 2010 – Mar 20, 2011. 
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Account. 
 
Gross national saving is 
calculated per SNA 2008, as 
Gross National Disposable 
Income (= GDP + Income + 
Current Transfers) minus 
Total Consumption (private 
and public), expressed as 
percentage of GNDI.  
 
Investment is expressed as 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Financial sector in Afghanistan has developed rapidly in recent years. The number of 
commercial banks (including private & public banks and branches of foreign banks) reached 
17 banks in 2011. The total assets of the banking sector which were less than US$300 million 
in 2004 have soared to US$5.3 billion in December 2010. The commercial lending prime 
interest rate in Afghanistan is now at 15 percent which is almost at the same level as that in 
Iran and Pakistan (see Table 2.5). Loans-to-deposit ratio stands at 55 percent. Furthermore, 
there seems to be sufficient capital for investment in the economy, thanks to large current 
transfers that Afghanistan is receiving from the rest of the world (see Figure 2.4).  
Despite serious security challenges, Afghanistan has managed to attract a noticeable 
amount of foreign investment. According to official estimates, Afghanistan has received 
nearly $2 billion worth of foreign direct investment between 2003 and 2010;1 the sectors of 
telecommunications and construction have been the main investment sectors. However, in 
comparison with other countries in the world, Afghanistan is still far behind in terms of the 
quality of environment for investment: IFC (International Finance Corporation) and the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 2011 report ranks Afghanistan in 167th position among 183 
countries in the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Source: AISA (Afghanistan Investment Support Agency) 
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   The trade balance 
has improved since 2002, 
though the deficit remains 
very significant. The trade 
deficit which was over 60 
percent of GDP in 2005 has 
declined to below 40 percent 
in 2010. However, this 
decline is mainly due to a 
drop in imports, which were 
90 percent of GDP in 2005 
and have now decreased to 
just over 50 percent. On the 
other hand, exports despite 
having increased in nominal 
terms have shrunk as a percentage of GDP. Exports have doubled between 2002 and 2010 to 
$2.6 billion, but as a percentage of GDP they have actually declined over the same period 
from nearly 40 percent to around 15 percent, as shown in Figure 2.5. The real effective 
exchange rate (REER) shows that Afghanistan has lost severely its competitiveness position 
in the world. The REER appreciated by 27 percent between 2004 and 2010 – an appreciation 
that is mainly due to rising domestic prices. Nevertheless, the large trade deficit is balanced 
in the current account by the huge inflow of foreign aid. In fact, current account is nearly 
balanced, and there does not seem to be any external disequilibrium which would put 
pressure on the exchange rate. But any shock to aid inflow would severely affect the current 
account balance and may engender a serious balance-of-payments crisis. 
The fiscal position remains very poor. Although domestic revenues have doubled as a 
percentage of GDP between 2003 and 2010, there is still a modest gain in terms of fiscal 
balance. Domestic revenues cover merely half of total expenditures; only 47 percent of total 
budget were covered by domestic revenues in 2010/11. The remaining deficit is financed by 
foreign aid in the form of budget support. Domestic revenues are not even sufficient to 
finance entirely the operating budget – they could only cover 65 percent of recurrent 
expenditures in 2010. This raises serious concerns over the fiscal sustainability in 
Afghanistan. The IMF forecasts a balanced fiscal budget no earlier than 2023. This forecast, 
however, is based on the presumption that the security situation will not deteriorate. Any 
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worsening security situation and/or an increase in security forces beyond 2013, and thus an 
increase in military budget, would postpone the fiscal sustainability by several other years.  
 The Human Development Report 
puts Afghanistan in the category of 
countries with “low” HDI (Human 
Development Index). Afghanistan is thus 
the only country among its neighbours to 
be ranked in this category. All other 
neighbouring countries are in “middle” 
and “high” HDI categories. However, 
inequality appears to be the lowest in 
Afghanistan as indicates the GINI 
coefficient. Furthermore, according to a 
2007 study, 36 percent of the Afghan 
population lives under the national 
poverty line of 1,255 Afs. per month, 
which puts it – in the region – after 
Pakistan with a headcount poverty rate of 51 percent.  
Table 2.5: Regional comparison of development indicators 
 Afghanistan Pakistan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Iran 
GDP per capita (2009; 
current US$) 
486 955 716 1,182 3,745 4,540 
8-year average growth 
rate (2003-2010) 
11.9 5.2 7.6 7.6 12.1 4.1 
8-year average Inflation 
(2003-2010) 
11.4 9.6 11.0 11.4 6.6 15.0 
Commercial lending 
Interest rate 
15.0 15.0 23.1 ? ? 12.0 
Poverty headcount rate 36 51 17 2 ? ? 
GINI Index 29 31 33 37 43 38 
HDI (ranking among 
169 countries; 2010) 
0.349  
(155th) 
0.490  
(125th) 
0.580  
(112th) 
0.617 
(102nd) 
0.669       
(87th) 
0.702    
(70th) 
Sources: WDI; IMF WEO; EconomyWatch.com (for interest rate); and Human Development Report 2009; 
Note: Data on poverty and GINI index is of 2009 for all countries with the exception of Afghanistan, for which 
data is of 2007. 
 
The informal sector is significantly large in Afghanistan. The World Bank estimates 
that 80 to 90 percent of economic activity in Afghanistan occurs in the informal sector, 
“which has been largely responsible for the recent economic recovery and dynamism” (World 
Bank, 2004). A large part of the informal sector is the opium economy; drug-related activities 
Figure 2.6: Fiscal projections 
Source: IMF (2010) 
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(including opium production and processing activities) are estimated to equal 35 percent of 
GDP (World Bank, 2004). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) estimates 
that the farm-gate value of opium production was 5 percent of GDP in 2010.  Once opium 
production is taken out of the agricultural output figures, the share of agriculture sector is 
reduced from around 30 percent to around 25 percent – making it as large as the industries 
sector. However, the gross export value of opiates is estimated at 11 percent of licit GDP in 
2010 – a figure which was 50 percent in 2003 (UNODC, 2010). If the exports of drugs are 
included in the Balance of Payments statistics, the current account balance turns to be in a 
large surplus. This might be one of the factors which have prevented the Afghani in the last 
six years from depreciation. 
1.3. Foreign aid in Afghan economy 
 
 Afghanistan has been one of the major aid recipients in the last decade. According to 
the World Bank data, over the period 2000-2009 Afghanistan was the sixth largest recipient 
of official aid in terms of proportion to GDP. The average aid Afghanistan has received 
amounts to 35 percent of GDP. However, if we ignore the small states,1 Afghanistan becomes 
the third largest recipient country after Liberia and Burundi. In terms of nominal value, 
Afghanistan was the second largest recipient after Iraq, receiving $26 billion in official aid 
between 2000 and 2009. Table 2.6 enlists eleven top recipient countries of official 
development assistance2 over the period 2000-2009. In terms of proportion to GDP, although 
Afghanistan comes in the sixth position, the total GDP of the first five countries altogether 
does not even reach a quarter of the Afghan GDP. 
Table 2.6: Largest aid recipients over the period 2000-2009 
 
Average 
ODA/GDP 
 
Total ODA received 
(billion US$; net) 
Liberia 62.8 Iraq 60.0 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 42.7 Afghanistan 26.6 
Timor-Leste 42.6 Nigeria 24.3 
Burundi 38.5 Vietnam 20.6 
Marshall Islands 35.8 Ethiopia 20.2 
Afghanistan 35.4 Tanzania 18.5 
Sierra Leone 31.4 Congo, Dem. Rep. 18.5 
Solomon Islands 31.0 Pakistan 17.6 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 27.3 India 15.6 
Iraq 26.7 Mozambique 15.1 
Mozambique 26.2 China 14.9 
                                                
1 Commonwealth Secretariat defines “small states” as countries with a population of 1.5 million or less. 
2 Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprises all flows of official financing which are disbursed at 
concessional terms (i.e. having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). ODA include both bilateral and 
multilateral aid. It excludes, however, grants from non-governmental organisations and charities raised through 
private or individual contributions.    
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Source: WDI and OECD STAT;  
Figures above include disbursements by both DAC and non-DAC member countries. 
 
According to the data provided by the Afghan Ministry of Finance, almost one-fifth of 
all official assistance has been allocated to “security” issues. Agriculture and rural 
development have received 13 percent of all assistance, followed by energy and education, 
each one receiving 9% and 7% respectively. As Figure 2.7 shows, the sectors of transport, 
governance and health have received equal shares of almost 6 percent. 
Foreign aid has a significant weight in the Afghan economy. In the year 2010/11, 
foreign grants financed almost half of the core budget (operating plus development), while 
domestic revenues could only cover up to 65 percent of the operating budget. As it is shown 
in Figure 2.8, the current account has been almost in balance in recent years. However, once 
we exclude foreign aid inflows, the current account turns to be in large deficit of nearly 50 
percent of GDP. This shows the extent to which the Afghan economy is dependent on foreign 
aid inflows. Any shock to aid inflows could create serious macroeconomic imbalances. On 
the fiscal side, the government will be obliged to finance the remaining part of the budget 
through borrowing from domestic and foreign markets, which will increase its stock of debt. 
This will seriously affect the fiscal sustainability of the country.  Joya and Faeeq (2009) 
analysed fiscal sustainability in Afghanistan in case of a shock to foreign aid. They studied a 
scenario under which ODA in the form of budget support dropped to a level of 50 billion Afs. 
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Figure 2.7: Sectoral decomposition of ODA disbursements over 2000-2010 
Source: DAD (Development Assistance Database), Ministry of Finance 
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or US$ 1 billion in 2015 (down from 80 billion Afs in 2009)1 and then remained constant till 
2030. Based on the assumption that the government will be able to borrow domestically by 
2011 (through the issuance of treasury bills) and that the average share of domestic debt in 
total debt will be 25 percent, their results showed that in case of such a shock to budget-
support aid, the stock of debt will soar from a level of 12% in 2009 to more than 70% in 
2030. However, their assumption that Afghanistan will be able to borrow from foreign 
markets – satisfying the remaining 75% of financing needed – seems almost unrealistic 
because poor countries which are in difficult fiscal situation cannot easily get non-
concessional loans from abroad even under high risk premium rates. Therefore, the actual 
impact of such a shock on fiscal sustainability might be even larger than what Joya and 
Faeeq’s (2009) results show. 
On the external side, any shock to foreign aid inflows will cause large deficits in the 
current account and will engender a balance-of-payments crisis. This will put downward 
pressure on the exchange rate which will further exacerbate the situation given the large size 
of imports in the Afghan economy. The Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank) which has 
accumulated more than $5 billion of gross reserves ($5.3 billion as of March 2011
2
) will lose 
rapidly its foreign reserves and will not be able to practice effectively its monetary policy, 
since the foreign exchange auction is the principal instrument of its monetary targeting 
                                                
1 The actual level of foreign grants as budget support in 2009/10 was 79.5 billion Afs. 
2 IMF estimates the import coverage of foreign exchange reserves at 14.3 months. 
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system. Hence, vulnerability of the Afghan economy to shocks in foreign aid inflow is 
extremely high, and all effort must be made to decrease the exposure of the Afghan economy 
to external shocks.   
1.4. Macroeconomic volatility in Afghanistan 
 
In section I.1.4, different methods for measuring volatility were explained. My 
approach in this section will be to take the standard deviation of growth rates or of the 
logarithmic first-difference, in the case of short series; while I will proceed with applying the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter on long series (on their logarithmic values) and then calculate the 
standard variation of the cyclical component. 
 Macroeconomic volatility in the Afghan economy is remarkably high. Output and 
prices have become more and more volatile as economic development has intensified. Real 
GDP growth has fluctuated between 3.4 percent and 28.6 percent since 2002, with a standard 
deviation of 7.6. Inflation (12-month CPI change) which was 6 percent in May 2007 
skyrocketed to 43 percent in the same month next year. Twelve months later in May 2009, it 
plunged to -15.8 percent – showing a strong deflation. Since then, it is now recovering and 
has reached around 16 percent at the end of the year 1389 (2010/11). Its standard deviation 
amounts to 12.3. The exchange rate, however, has been stable. Although serious oscillations 
appeared in 2003 after the introduction of the new Afghani, the exchange rate has been 
fluctuating in a narrow band around 50 Afs. since 2004.  
Figure 2.9: Trend and volatility in selected economic variables 
Real GDP 
Real GDP growth (2002-2010) 
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Figure 2.9 shows volatility in selected economic variables. For some series, trend and 
cyclical components have been decomposed and demonstrated in separate graphics. Needless 
to say the standard deviation calculated on the cyclical components of these series ought to be 
between 0 and 1 because the initial values are in logarithmic form. For the level of prices, the 
standard deviation has been calculated separately both on its growth rate (i.e. inflation) and 
on the cyclical component of its indices (i.e. consumer prices index). 
 Volatility in output and in prices, combined with a highly uncertain macroeconomic 
environment and large macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. fiscal deficit) may have serious costs 
in terms of welfare loss and rise in poverty in Afghanistan, and may seriously undermine the 
long-term growth in the country – as explained in section I.2.  
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2. Diagnostic approach to macroeconomic instability in 
Afghanistan 
 
 As explained in the earlier sections, macroeconomic instability may have serious 
negative consequences in terms of long-term growth, welfare, inequality and poverty. Even if 
a country has a high average-growth-rate, in the presence of macroeconomic instability it will 
not be able to sustain this rate over the long-term. In fact, igniting and sustaining growth are 
not always the same enterprise; they need different policies, instruments and institutional 
arrangements (Rodrik, 2007). Part I concluded that macroeconomic instability is both a 
source and a reflection of underdevelopment. This implies that macroeconomic instability 
and underdevelopment interact within a vicious cycle, each re-enforcing the other. Thus, if 
development and growth-enhancing policies are not coupled with effective long-term 
stabilisation policies, then it is hard to imagine if the country could get out of the poverty trap 
and underdevelopment soon enough. Long-term stabilisation policies – not only of 
macroeconomic but also of structural nature – are necessary for the success and effectiveness 
of development and growth-enhancing policies over the long-run. 
These stabilisation policies cannot be adopted randomly or without looking at the 
nature of instability in the country. If instability comes from volatility in a monetary variable, 
then policies aiming at stabilising real indicators might not have any positive impact – in 
some cases they might even worsen the situation. Or if instability is generated by uncertainty 
in political environment, then short-term stabilisation policies of monetary origin will be of 
no help at all. In addition, tackling macroeconomic instability cannot be done either by 
simply applying all A-to-Z known stabilisation policies in a country, hoping that some of 
these policies and reforms will target the source of instability and will correct the 
distortionary elements. As a matter of fact, some policies and reforms might be stabilising in 
some countries with a specific environment, and might be de-stabilising in others. Thus, 
appropriate stabilisation policies are needed for each specific nature of instability.  
The methodology I am proposing in this section is based on the above considerations. 
It requires two sets of pre-requisite knowledge. First, one has to carefully identify the source 
or sources of instability; as to which economic activities, or distortionary market elements, or 
institutional arrangements generate instability in the economy. This can be done through 
various empirical and analytical methods, and is almost always practically doable. Secondly, 
having knowledge of the local context is indispensable. Rodrik (2007) has insisted that 
appropriate policies are almost always context specific. “This is not because economics works 
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differently in different settings, but because the environments in which households, firms, and 
investors operate differ in terms of the opportunities and constraints they present.”  
My approach in this section is of a diagnostic one. I proceed in three steps: First, I 
study the nature of macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan, as to pinpoint each economic 
variable which exhibits strong volatility and fluctuation. Secondly, I identify the source(s) of 
instability for each of these economic variables: the political, institutional and economic 
factors which are generating volatility over these variables, creating imbalances in the 
economy, and which are producing uncertainty in the environment. Finally, I will propose 
appropriate policies and reforms for each of these sources separately, in order to stabilise the 
economy as a whole. 
I carried out the first step in page 51. I now proceed with the remaining task in the 
subsequent sections. 
2.1. Sources of macroeconomic instability 
 (i) Price volatility 
 
 Prices have been more volatile than growth as it was shown in Figure 2.9. Within 12 
months between May 2008 and May 2009, the CPI inflation dropped from its peak of 43.2 
percent to -15.8 percent. 
Its standard deviation 
amounts to 12.3 percent. 
The first type of question 
to ask is whether this 
inflation is imported or is 
generated domestically. 
Looking at the 
decomposition of CPI 
inflation to imported and 
non-imported elements, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.0, 
one could easily observe 
that the large fluctuations 
in level of prices are 
generated by external 
shocks transmitted 
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through the trade channel. Given the high degree of openness of the Afghan economy, 
imported items constitute 47.9 percent of the overall CPI basket. Imported inflation reached 
as high as 74.5 percent in May 2008 and plunged to as low as -29.4 percent in May 2009. 
While over the same period, non-imported inflation fluctuated very narrowly between 18.8 
and -0.3 percents.  The standard deviation of imported and non-imported inflation thus differ 
remarkably; 21.7 and 8.3 percents, respectively. 
To identify the sources of price volatility in Afghanistan, I use an econometric model 
of log-log structure. Consumer prices index (CPI) is chosen as the indicator of the level of 
prices. Internal shocks are proxied by the stock of money in circulation or M0 (CIC) and the 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER). Terms-of-trade shocks are proxied by the average 
world prices of crude oil (OIL) and the world prices of cereals (WCRL), calculated 
respectively by the IMF and the FAO as indexes. These two indexes are chosen because 
Afghanistan is entirely an oil-importing country, and imports a large amount of cereals each 
year – it is not yet self-sufficient in cereal production. The impact of these variables on the 
Afghan economy is transmitted after a quarter due to lags in transportation and other trade 
barriers. Climate shocks are proxied by the average amount of rainfall (RAIN). Both current 
and first lag of this variable is included in the regression because the maturity period of some 
crops may extend to two quarters. Finally, political instability is proxied by the number of 
civilian deaths (DT). 
An important variable in the model is the price ratio of non-tradable goods to 
tradables (NTT). It contains an enormous amount of information as to whether inflation-
generating shocks come from the internal or the external sources. If these are the internal 
sources which drive inflation up or down, then there should be positive correlation between 
the prices of non-tradable goods and the overall CPI inflation. But if the shocks are of 
external nature, then we should expect that the prices of tradable goods will increase and fall 
much faster than the prices of non-tradable goods. In this case, there will be a negative 
correlation between CPI inflation and the price ratio of non-tradables to tradables.  
In order to study the volatility in domestic prices and its relation with “shocks” to the 
exogenous variables, the model uses the ‘growth in level’ of each variable, except for the 
variable NTT and RAIN. As explained in section I.1.4, by using the logarithmic growth rate 
of variables, the model captures the shocks and volatility in each variable and will tell us how 
much of a shock to a given explanatory variable may cause volatility in the dependent 
variable. However, since we are not concerned with the shock and variability in the ‘price 
ratio of non-tradables to tradables’ rather with the association between the ratio itself and the 
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price volatility, I use the level of ratio instead of its variation. Likewise, the level of rainfall at 
each quarter is used instead of its quarterly variation, because each four quarter through a 
year represents different climatic conditions. 
 The model is regressed using quarterly data. The choice of the frequency of data is not 
made randomly. In fact, high frequency data such as monthly series include other temporary 
and transitory shocks which will affect our estimation results. While, on the contrary, low 
frequency data (i.e. annual) will not allow us to study the short-term cyclical behaviour of our 
variables of concern. Therefore, the choice of quarterly data has been made carefully. 
Table 2.7: Estimation Results 
Dependent variable: DLOG(CPI) 
Method: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2003Q2 – 2011Q1 
Number of observations: 32 after adjustment 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
C 0.0039  
(0.42) 
0.7414 
(2.43) 
0.6884  
(2.19) 
0.6836 
(2.10) 
0.6913 
(2.10) 
DLOG(CIC) 0.1867  
(1.45) 
 0.1309  
(1.06) 
0.1189 
(0.91) 
0.1342 
(1.00) 
DLOG(NEER) -0.1413  
(-1.04) 
 
 
-0.1028 
(-0.80) 
-0.1238 
(-0.89) 
-0.1269 
(-0.90) 
LOG(NTT)  
 
-0.1544 
(-2.39) 
-0.1446 
(-2.18) 
-0.1403 
(-2.03) 
-0.1396 
(-1.99) 
DLOG(OIL(-1)) 0.0763  
(2.32) 
0.0707 
(2.28) 
0.0656 
(2.11) 
0.0589 
(1.67) 
0.0578 
(1.62) 
DLOG(WCRL(-1)) 0.1919 
(3.45) 
0.1675 
(3.29) 
0.1840 
(3.52) 
0.1921 
(3.41) 
0.1926 
(3.39) 
LOG(RAIN)    -0.0027 
(-0.41) 
-0.0023 
(-0.35) 
LOG(RAIN(-1))    -0.0023 
(-0.39) 
-0.0070 
(-0.81) 
DLOG(DEATH)     0.0134 
(0.73) 
R-squared 0.5269 0.5617 0.5998 0.6046 0.6135 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0009 0.0019 
D-W statistic 1.7765 1.7272 1.8619 1.8527 1.8848 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
The model is regressed using different explanatory variables in order to test the 
robustness of the model. Table 2.7 shows the estimation results of five different regressions 
for the model. Looking at column 3, more than half of the variance of the dependent variable 
is explained by the model, the signs of all variables are theoretically consistent, and the 
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Durbin-Watson statistic indicates no autocorrelation.1 The results show that money growth 
and shocks to exchange rate do not have any impact on the volatility of prices, as they are 
both statistically insignificant. This may support the argument that the relationship between 
money growth and the level of prices is not stable in developing countries in the short-run. 
Particularly in an economy undergoing rapid financial liberalization, – which is the case in 
Afghanistan – the parameters characterizing the demand for money (notably the interest 
elasticity of money demand) and the relation between the monetary aggregate and inflation 
may be highly unstable (Agénor, 2004). Moreover, other empirical studies have found that 
monetary aggregates cannot be optimally used as information variables for inflation or 
nominal income (Mishkin, 2007). On the other hand, despite the fact that almost half of 
consumer spending items in Afghanistan is imported and that any shock to the exchange rate 
will have a significant impact on prices, the observed data since 2003 does not show such an 
incident; the nominal exchange rate has been almost stable and has never experienced any 
serious shocks which could have produced volatility in the prices. 
 The most important result of the model is that there is a strong negative coefficient for 
the variable NTT. This gives a strong signal that the sources and shocks of inflation are of 
external nature. If these shocks were produced internally, then the prices of non-tradable 
goods would have increased or fallen faster than those of tradable goods, hence showing a 
positive correlation between the ratio NTT and the overall inflation. However, a negative 
correlation means that inflation is strongly associated with the price movements in tradable 
goods – which is the case in our results. This evidence helps us with making a conclusive 
judgement that price volatility in Afghanistan is driven primarily by external shocks. 
 Another interesting result of the model is that shocks to world prices of oil and cereals 
explain together almost a quarter of price volatility in Afghanistan. Particularly, a one-
percentage shock to world prices of cereals induces 18.4 percent volatility in the level of 
prices in Afghanistan. One question which comes to our mind is that why shocks to the world 
prices of cereals engender more volatility in domestic prices compared to shocks to the world 
prices of oil, despite the fact that Afghanistan imports its entire oil requirement from abroad 
but produces more than half of its cereal requirement domestically. The answer is that food 
items constitute almost two-thirds of Afghan consumer spending, and particularly “cereals” 
make 28 percent of total CPI basket. Hence, shocks to world food prices have more impact on 
domestic prices compared to those of oil. 
                                                
1 Even if there were an autocorrelation between the residuals, it would not matter in our case because we are 
only studying the relation between the variables and we do not use the model to make forecasts. Nevertheless, 
the current D-W statistic of 1.862 is well above the relevant (k=5, t=32) greater bound value of dU=1.597. 
Hence, we can conclusively decide not to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation. 
 All five regressions indicate that addition or omission of variables does not modify 
the estimated coefficients or their level of significance. Through all regressions, monetary 
aggregate (CIC) and NEER are insignificant, while the variable ‘world prices of cereals’ 
(WCRL) remains significant and maintains almost the same estimated value of coefficient. 
OIL, however, is significant at nearly 10 percent of error. The variables rainfall and number 
of civilian deaths (DT) remain insignificant. This shows that climatic and political shocks do 
not have any impact on price volatility in Afghanistan. This does not seem to be unrealistic, 
because climatic shocks do affect output growth and may lead to a drop in agricultural 
production, but the supply deficit for agricultural crops is normally compensated by imported 
crops. Therefore, climatic shocks do not lead to sudden jumps in prices. 
Given the limited number of observations (i.e. micronumerosity), there is a risk of 
multicollinearity among the regressors. One of the consequences of multicollinearity is that 
the coefficient of determination will be high (generally above 0.90) but there will be few 
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significant t-statistics. Looking at our all five regressions, we do not observe such pattern in 
our estimation results. For further vigilance, figure 3.1 shows the scatterplot for the three 
suspected explanatory variables, namely NTT, OIL and WCRL. The scatterplot indicates 
that, as a whole, there is no strong multicollinearity among the three variables. 
Heteroskedasticity may also occur in our model because data has been transformed into 
ratios, first difference and logarithmic forms. The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for all five 
regressions rejects the existence of heteroskedasticity. 
Conclusion: Based on the estimation results of our model, we can conclude that terms-of-
trade shocks explain “significant” portion of price volatility in Afghanistan. Shocks to world 
prices of oil and cereals explain almost a quarter of variations in prices. This also shows that 
low-degree of diversification in the production structure is another factor which has exposed 
the Afghan economy to external shocks. In fact, Afghanistan has a high degree of exports 
concentration; it exports only few export items. 
(ii) Growth volatility 
 
 Identifying the sources of growth volatility could be done through two different 
methods. One way would be to construct an econometric growth model, integrating both 
internal and external factors, and then to regress this model using time series data. The model 
should be built in a way as it would permit to easily observe the volatility pattern in each 
variable. In this way, using actual data, it would be possible to see which shocks to certain 
variables caused volatility in the growth rate. This method is preferable since it can 
incorporate all external variables which do not directly enter in the growth equation but 
which affect growth indirectly through their impact on growth determinants. 
 Another way, in case of limited time series data, would be to decompose the real GDP 
growth into its sectoral elements and to find those sectors whose volatility induced 
fluctuations in total output. Once we identified volatile sectors, we could then study the 
shocks affecting these sectors. These shocks can be induced by either internal or external 
factors. However, this method will only let us find the sectoral shocks, and those external 
shocks which are transmitted through other channels to the economy (and not through output 
sectors) cannot be identified. Nonetheless, I proceed with the latter approach due to lack of 
sufficient time series data. 
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Table 2.8: Real GDP growth by sectoral decomposition 
  2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
  1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 
Agriculture 17.1 -4.9 6.7 0.6 24.6 -16.5 23.3 
  (45.6) (39.7) (37.0) (33.4) (35.9) (29.3) (32.9) 
Cereals and 
other crops 
20.9 -7.5 9.5 0.0 28.7 -20.2 27.6 
(37.7) (31.9) (30.5) (27.4) (30.4) (23.7) (27.6) 
Industries 6.1 32.1 23.9 20.1 7.3 5.7 5.5 
  (18.1) (21.8) (23.6) (25.5) (23.5) (24.6) (23.1) 
Manufacturing -2.9 21.7 19.5 14.5 5.1 2.3 4.0 
  (12.6) (14.0) (14.6) (15.1) (13.6) (13.9) (11.7) 
Construction 36.1 56.2 32.3 30.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 
  (5.3) (7.5) (8.7) (10.2) (9.6) (10.3) (11.0) 
Services 13.7 16.2 14.6 16.9 14.2 13.8 17.3 
  (34.5) (36.6) (36.7) (38.5) (37.9) (43.0) (40.9) 
Transport and 
Communications 
45.4 12.9 10.5 26.6 19.3 18.0 19.0 
(13.1) (13.6) (13.1) (14.9) (15.3) (17.6) (18.1) 
GDP growth (CSO) 14.3 9.4 14.5 11.2 16.2 2.3 17.1 
GDP growth (IMF) 15.1 9.4 16.4 8.2 14.2 3.4 20.4 
Figures in parentheses are percentage shares in GDP. Shaded columns are years corresponding to the 
“troughs” of fluctuations in growth.  
Source: CSO 
 
  
Table 2.8 shows sectoral decomposition of real GDP growth for the period 2003-
2009. We notice that volatility in output growth is always induced by shocks to the 
agriculture sector which has a large weight in GDP (over 30 percent). Data also shows that 
the cyclical behaviour of GDP growth is a function of the level of agricultural output. The 
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“troughs” in growth fluctuation (i.e. in 2004, 2006 and 2008) coincides with a drop in 
agricultural production, while the “peaks” coincides with a booming agricultural output, as it 
is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The years 2004, 2006 and 2008 were the years of severe shortfall 
in rain; either the amount of rainfall was totally insufficient, or the rainfall did not occur at 
the right season and was not equally distributed all over the country. In 2004, Afghanistan 
experienced a severe drought. Total cereal production dropped from a level of over 5 million 
tonnes in previous year to almost 3 million tonnes, raising cereal deficit (requirement for 
cereal imports) to over 2 million tonnes. Total value added for the agriculture sector declined 
by almost 5 percent in that year. However, this decline was partially offset by a large increase 
in industrial sector which grew by more than 30 percent. Hence, real GDP growth did not 
drop lower than 9 percent. In 2008, due to a strong shortfall in rain, agricultural output 
declined by 16.5 percent. Cereal production and deficit were almost at the same levels as 
those in 2004. But this time, neither industries nor services grew at a level which could have 
offset the decline in agriculture sector. The real GDP growth dropped to an all-time low of 
2.3 percent. The following year (2009), as climatic conditions were highly favourable, 
agricultural output increased by 23.3 percent, pushing the total output growth to 20.4 percent.  
 Other sectors, such as those in industries and services, do not seem to be causing 
strong volatility in GDP growth. First, because the weight of other sectors in GDP is smaller, 
and secondly, their growth is not as volatile as that of agriculture sector. 
Conclusion: The above analyses show that growth volatility in Afghanistan is engendered by 
supply-side shocks, particularly by climatic shocks. Productivity shocks in the sub-sectors of 
industry and services do not have substantial impact on GDP (at least over the medium term), 
because their respective shares in GDP are still smaller compared to that of the agriculture 
sector.  
(iii) Overall macroeconomic instability 
  
 In addition to volatility in growth and prices, the overall macroeconomic environment 
in Afghanistan has become more and more unstable in the last couple of years. Uncertainty 
concerning the economic environment has accrued, and prospects for the future of the 
economy and the country have highly deteriorated. Investment climate which kept improving 
until 2007 has since been degrading. According to AISA (Afghanistan Investment Support 
Agency), total initial capital invested in 2010 was only half of what it was in 2006 ($1.2 
billion).  
 Essentially, there are three major factors which instigate and exacerbate 
macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan: 
• Political shocks and instability 
• Weak institutions 
• Social fragmentation 
Political instability may be 
the fundamental causal element 
behind the degradation of 
macroeconomic stability in recent 
years. Security has deteriorated 
severely since 2007, and the 
number of civilian deaths has 
almost doubled in 2010 (see Figure 
3.3). The World Bank consistently 
decreased its political stability 
index for Afghanistan between 
2003 and 2009, as shown in Table 
2.9. Political shocks such as 
increased suicide attacks targeting 
key political figures and governmental units, the announcement of withdrawal of NATO 
troops in 2014,1 preliminary negotiations with the Taliban for a possible reconciliation,2 and 
the recent tension between the executive, legislature and judiciary3 have seriously affected 
macroeconomic stability in Afghanistan. Anwar al-Haq Ahadi, the Afghan Minister of 
Commerce and Industries, believes that such political tensions are the only cause of recent 
exchange rate depreciation.4 In fact, empirical studies have found that political instability and 
political tensions increase macroeconomic instability and may affect long-term growth either 
directly, or indirectly through inducing economic volatility (Campos and Karanasos, 2007; 
Klomp and de Haan, 2009). Even though the relation between political shocks and economic 
instability may not be that strong in developed and stable countries, but in post-conflict 
countries such as Afghanistan this association is usually much stronger and significant.  
                                                
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/20/nato-afghanistan-2014-withdrawal-lisbon (accessed 
13/07/2011) 
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/world/asia/29afghan.html (accessed 13/07/2011) 
3 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B117-afghanistans-elections-stalemate.aspx 
(accessed 13/07/2011) 
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/07/110710_k02-afghani-currency.shtml (accessed 13/07/2011) 
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 Another major source of macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan is weak 
institutions. As explained in page 32, weak institutions produce and intensify macroeconomic 
instability via a variety of microeconomic and macroeconomic channels. When institutions 
are weak, the negative impact of exogenous shocks on the economy is amplified, and 
resources in the economy are expropriated by political elites. Undoubtedly, Afghanistan is an 
institutionally-weak country which lost its entire institutional infrastructure during its more 
than two decades of political crisis. Poor rule of law, inefficient judiciary system, widespread 
corruption, government inefficiency, absence of property rights, high degree of political 
instability, and absence of egalitarian and democratic rights are some of the most important 
institutional deficiencies in Afghanistan. The World Bank puts Afghanistan at some of the 
lowest percentile rankings for its World Governance Indicators, as shown in Table 2.9. These 
institutional quality indices show that some institutional indicators in Afghanistan improved 
between 2003 and 2007 but started to deteriorate after 2007. Transparency International 
downgraded Afghanistan from the 172
nd
 position in 2007 to 179
th
 in 2009 – out of 180 
countries – for its Corruption Perceptions Index. 
 Weak institutions produce strong instability in the macroeconomic environment. On 
the one hand, they fail to stabilize the effects of external and exogenous shocks on the 
economy, and on the other hand, they are unable to resolve the idiosyncratic, economic and 
political problems that exist in the society. A pertinent example which perfectly portrays how 
weak institutions and corruption can destabilize the economy is the fraud and corruption 
scandal of Kabul Bank which broke out in summer 2010.1 One of the largest private 
commercial banks in Afghanistan, Kabul Bank granted unsecured loans worth US$ 925 
million (including their accumulated interest) to high-ranking government officials and 
political elite without any collateral or even proper documentation. When the government 
officials learned Kabul Bank had initially lost $300 million, an amount twice as much as the 
bank’s capital, the Central Bank took over the bank in August 2010. Panic burst as depositors 
rushed to withdraw their money, and confidence in the financial sector was seriously hurt. 
The Central Bank injected funds into the bank to insure its solvency and to avoid any 
nationwide financial crisis. The IMF pressed for the bank being put at receivership, a 
proposal which the Central Bank effectively implemented in April 2011. However, the 
Ministry of Finance could not come to an agreement with the IMF which insisted on bailing 
out the bank with an $810 million fund and taking its ownership until the bank is acquired by 
the private sector. The failure to meet IMF’s demand prompted the World Bank and other 
                                                
1 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/kabul_bank/ (accessed 15/07/2011); 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/16/kabul-bank-afghanistan-financial-scandal (accessed 15/07/2011) 
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donors to withhold some $70 million of their fund which most of it is used for the payment of 
government salaries. Notwithstanding the whole scandal, the trial of involved parties is yet to 
be done. 
Table 2.9: Institutional assessments of Afghanistan 
   2003 2007 2009 
World Governance 
Indicators 
World Bank Percentile rank    
(0-100) 
   
Voice and accountability   9.1 16.3 10.0 
Political stability   3.8 1.4 0.9 
Government 
effectiveness 
  7.8 6.8 3.3 
Regulatory quality   2.9 2.9 2.9 
Rule of law   1.9 1.0 0.5 
Control of corruption   1.5 1.9 1.4 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 
Transparency 
International 
World ranking: 
180 countries 
? 172 179 
Institutional Quality Index International 
Policy 
Network 
World ranking: 
191 countries 
? 164 182 
 
 Hence, corruption involving a large network of political figures, the inability of 
institutions to detect and constrain such fraudulent activities by political elite, and finally the 
inefficiency of judiciary system to put into trial the involved parties led to collapse of 
confidence in the financial sector, to instability in the fiscal system, and to economy-wide 
instability and uncertainty.   
 Social fragmentation may also significantly contribute in macroeconomic instability. 
In a society where “fractionalisation” exists inside the government elite and where the 
institutions of conflict management are weak, non-cooperative powerful groups engage in a 
“redistributive struggle” which will result in national resources being allocated in non-taxable 
inefficient sectors. In such a country, powerful groups respond in a perverse way to 
exogenous shocks and hence these shocks will generate a more-than-proportionate 
consequences in the economy, generating instability and uncertainty in the macroeconomic 
environment (for more details, refer to page 25). 
Afghanistan, too, is a country with deep social fragmentation, and fractionalization 
among the government elite. There are more than ten ethnic groups, and more than thirty 
spoken languages in Afghanistan. Although no national census has been conducted in 
Afghanistan, except for a partial census in 1979,1 rough estimations indicate that Pashtuns are 
the largest group with 42 percent of population, followed by Tajiks 27%, Hazaras 9%, 
                                                
1 Source: “Afghanistan.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. DVD version. Ultimate Reference Suite 2010 
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Uzbeks 9%, and other smaller groups accounting for the rest of the population.1 Pashto and 
Dari (Persian) are the official languages of the state, and other six major languages become 
the third official language – in addition to the two previous – in areas where they are spoken 
by the majority of people. Persian/Dari which is spoken by almost half of the population1,2 
serves as the lingua franca for the speakers of different languages in the country.2  
Although dissensions exist more or less between all ethnic groups, rivalry between the 
Pashto-speaking Pashtuns and the Persian-speaking Tajiks and Hazaras is more visible at the 
political sphere. In a pluralistic society in which no group forms the majority (per its 
definition of forming more than half of the individuals) tensions are usually high. 
Historically, tensions in Afghanistan aroused in the first half of the 20th century when in 1936 
the government imposed Pashto as an official language in addition to Persian. Civil war 
subsequent to the Russian withdrawal in 1989 accrued ethnic conflict as parties involved in 
the war were formed based on ethnic and regional relations. Although since 2002 ethnic 
tensions have soothed and the new constitution in 2004 recognized equal rights for all ethnic 
and linguistic groups, fractionalisation among the political elite is still largely present. 
Several ministers have so far been accused by their opposition groups for exploiting their 
power in favour of their own ethnic groups. Such fractionalisation among the government 
officials, involved in high-level decision-making process, ends up in disagreements over both 
political agendas and economic measures, which, by itself, creates instability in political and 
economic environments. One example of such political process is disagreement over the 
ongoing negotiations with the Taliban. Furthermore, as Tornell and Lane (1999) explained, 
powerful groups dynamically interact and maintain discretionary fiscal redistribution to 
allocate national resources in favour of their own groups. In fact, several such instances have 
taken place in Afghanistan, and several political figures are accused by various groups or 
individuals for expropriating the resources. 
As stated earlier, social fragmentation and political fractionalisation interact with 
weak institutions of conflict management and thus generate instability in macroeconomic 
environment. And social fragmentation in Afghanistan is one of the important sources of 
instability in the country that has to be addressed. 
 
                                                
1 Source: The World Factbook. CIA  
2 Sources: “Dari language.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. DVD version. Ultimate Reference Suite 2010; and 
“Dari.” UCLA Language Materials Project. http://www.lmp.ucla.edu/Profile.aspx?LangID=191&menu=004 
(accessed 16/07/2011) 
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2.2. Solutions 
 
 Previous section identified six major factors which induce macroeconomic instability 
in Afghanistan, namely: 
1) Supply-side shocks 
2) Terms-of-trade shocks 
3) Low degree of diversification 
4) Weak institutions 
5) Political shocks and instability 
6) Social fragmentation 
In this section, I propose a series of economic and structural policies which can help 
reduce volatility in the economy and ensure a long-term macroeconomic stability for the 
country. I do not engage, however, in discussing how to control political shocks and to bring 
about political stability. For, that is the objective of political science which requires its own 
set of rules, methods and analyses, which are out of the scope of this dissertation. I presume, 
henceforth, that the political actors in Afghanistan (i.e. government, international community, 
political parties, and civil society) will be able to find a political solution to the fifth source of 
instability, noted above. 
 To overcome the remaining five sources of instability mentioned above, I propose a 
set of four different policies that, if implemented altogether, would significantly improve 
macroeconomic stability in Afghanistan. These policies are to: 
1) Stimulate output in “key” output sectors 
2) Diversify the production structure 
3) Promote strong, efficient and democratic institutions 
4) Develop sound financial sector 
I sufficed to enlist only the most important and crucial policies needed to help 
overcome macro instability in Afghanistan. These can be further accompanied with 
complementary policies, such as creating risk-insurance mechanisms, pursuing stable and 
anti-cyclical policies, and enhancing automatic-stabilizers. 
For the four recommended policies, I will only provide general strategies and 
directions, and I will not engage in discussing all possible “instruments” for each of them, 
because doing so will open the discussion to vast areas of literature and policy research, 
which is totally out of the capacity of this work and goes beyond its objective. 
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(i) Stimulating output in “key” sectors 
 
 One way to tackle the supply-side and terms-of-trade shocks is to stimulate output in 
key sectors. By “key” I mean sectors which have the potential to overcome as many sources 
of instability as possible and to ensure a stable and sustainable growth over the long-term. I 
identify two sectors which can fulfill these functions; i.e. agriculture and natural resources 
sectors. 
Table 3.0: Expected outcome from key sectors 
Sector Outcome 
Agriculture 
• Stabilises output growth 
• Ensures a sustainable economic growth 
• Significantly decreases poverty  
• Reduces exposure to terms-of-trade shocks 
• Reduces the impact of supply-side shocks 
Natural resources 
• Increases fiscal revenue and improves fiscal 
sustainability 
• Reduces unemployment 
• Improves Balance-of-Payments position 
• Increases foreign exchange reserves 
 
A. Agriculture sector 
  
As explained in page 59, growth volatility in Afghanistan is primarily generated by 
volatility in agricultural output. Thus, stimulating output in the agriculture sector – and 
keeping it stable – will totally stabilise the real GDP growth. This would also avoid all sorts 
of volatility costs in terms of welfare loss and increase in inequality. Furthermore, obtaining a 
sustainable growth in Afghanistan is only possible if a stable agricultural growth is 
maintained and guaranteed. Agricultural growth is the key to a long-term sustainable growth 
in the country.  
 Since the Green Revolution in Asia in 1960s and 1970s, the “dual economy” theory – 
in which agriculture was viewed as a traditional and low-productivity sector contributing 
passively to economic development – has been swept aside. The possibility of transforming 
traditional agriculture to modern sector under the Green Revolution proved agriculture’s 
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potential as a source of growth and development. In an agriculture-dependent economy such 
as Afghanistan, only the agriculture sector has sufficient scale and growth-linkages to 
significantly influence growth. In fact, an important factor for determining the contribution of 
an output sector to economic growth is its linkages with the rest of the economy. Agriculture 
sector is found to have strong growth-linkages in many countries (Diao et al., 2010). I 
believe, given the current structure of the Afghan economy, this holds true for Afghanistan as 
well. 
Table 3.1: Different sectoral scenarios 
 
5-year average 
(2005-2009) 
 
2009 
2030 
Growth 
Share in 
GDP 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Agriculture 7.7 33.7 Real GDP (million Af.) 374,367   7,094,590   5,948,756  
Industries 12.5 24.1 Real GDP per capita 
(in Afghanis) 
12,274 126,916 106,418 
Services 15.4 39.4 
 
 The right section of Table 3.1 gives two different scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes a 10-
percent higher-than-average growth rate for the Agriculture sector through 2030 while keeps 
constant the average growth rate for other sectors. Scenario 2 assumes a 10-percent higher-
than-average growth rate for the Industries sector through 2030 while keeps constant the 
average growth rate for other sectors. According to Scenario 1, the real GDP will reach Af. 7 
trillion in 2030, while according to Scenario 2, this figure will be nearly Af. 6 trillion. Hence, 
a 10-percent growth in the agriculture sector will buy Afghanistan an additional 19.3 percent 
gain in real income within twenty years, compared to if the growth came from the industries. 
Despite the fact that these scenarios are based on very basic assumptions (for example 
assuming that the agriculture sector’s share will remain the same), it does show that the 
difference in gain between growth generated from the agriculture sector and growth 
generated from the industrial sector is significantly large in the agriculture-dependent 
Afghanistan. 
 Surveys indicate that 59 percent of employed Afghan population is engaged in 
agriculture sector (NRVA, 2009). Estimates put 85 percent of total population somehow 
dependent on income received from agriculture-related activities.1 Yet 36 percent of Afghan 
population falls below the poverty line. Figures show that 35.5 percent of households 
engaged in agriculture-related activities are identified as poor. Therefore, agriculture sector 
has the highest momentum to fight poverty. If all poor households engaged in agriculture 
                                                
1 Source: FAO, http://www.fao.org/emergencies/country_information/list/asia/afghanistan/en/ (accessed 
20/07/2011) 
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sector are taken out of poverty, then roughly 20 to 30 percent of the poor are elevated above 
the poverty line – which is a great achievement. Thus, agriculture sector is the most 
appropriate source for pro-poor growth in Afghanistan (Flaming and Roe, 2009). 
 Earlier section also found that the largest terms-of-trade shocks come from the trade 
in food items, especially shocks to world prices of cereals. If Afghanistan becomes self-
sufficient in cereal production, especially in wheat production, then its exposure to terms-of-
trade shocks reduces significantly.  
Is there a potential for output boom in agriculture sector? 
 There are 7.9 million hectares of arable land in Afghanistan which make almost 12 
percent of total land area in the country. However, just under half of arable land is cultivated. 
Almost 1.8 million hectares are irrigated, while the rainfed cultivated area is 1.7 million 
hectares.
1
 In 1978, there were more than 3 million hectares of irrigated land, but due to 
continuous war and several instances of drought, this proportion has declined by more than 
60 percent today (Flaming and Roe, 2009). The productivity of irrigated cultivation is far 
higher than that of rainfed. Irrigated cultivation represents more than 80 percent of total 
cereal production, and its average yield rate is 2.5 tonnes per hectare.2 Hence, more than half 
of arable land (4.4 million hectares) is left uncultivated and unused in Afghanistan. 
 The most major obstacle to crop cultivation in Afghanistan is poor irrigation system. 
Surveys show that 65 percent of those household farmers who left part of their irrigated land 
fallow (uncultivated) reported lack of water as the main reason (NRVA, 2009). However, 
water resources assessments show that there are sufficient water resources in Afghanistan and 
if they are well-managed, they could respond to all requirements in agriculture.  
Average annual volume of water in Afghanistan is estimated at 95 billion m3 of which 
88 percent is surface water and 12 percent groundwater (Rout, 2008). There are five major 
river basins in the country (including Oxus or Amu Darya, Northern basin, Hari Rod & 
Murghab, Helmand, and Kabul) which provide water to 86 percent of irrigated area through 
formal and informal irrigation systems. Formal irrigation system consists of ten large-scale 
irrigation schemes, administered by the government, which cover only 333,000 hectares of 
land – almost 18 percent of irrigated area. However, informal irrigation systems based on 
surface water (including river and streams) and administered by regional communities cover 
the largest proportion of irrigated land. From among 83 billion m3 of surface water flowing in 
the country per year, only around 17 billion m3 was in use a decade ago. With the 
                                                
1 Source: Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 1389, CSO 
2 Source: Agriculture Prospects Report, FAO/MAIL 
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rehabilitation of pre-war irrigation systems and improved management, water use is estimated 
to increase to 35 billion m3 per year (Rout, 2008). Assessments show that there is much 
potential for further usage of surface water for irrigation in Afghanistan (Rout, 2008; King 
and Sturtewagen, 2010). If the irrigation system is expanded, improved and better managed, 
then most of Afghanistan’s arable area could be cultivated.  
Nonetheless, I do not uniquely suggest agricultural expansion. In fact, intensification 
of agricultural production through increasing productivity and adopting suitable technologies 
may be more productive and efficient than simple land expansion. Agriculture sector in 
Afghanistan still operates in a very traditional form, using very basic technology, and at a 
very low level of productivity. Thus, transfer of technology and its application to the agro-
ecological condition of Afghanistan, development of supply chains around small-scale 
farmers, and modernising the agriculture sector will be a more productive and imperative 
strategy. 
Finally, with better irrigation system, higher productivity, and with modern and 
efficiently adopted technology (including drought-tolerant and flood-resistant seeds, more 
efficient fertilisers, modern machinery, etc.), the agriculture performance would depend less 
on timely rainfall. Hence, the impact of supply-side and climatic shocks on the Afghan 
economy will significantly decline. 
B. Natural resources 
  
Another key sector which can play an important role in macroeconomic stability in 
Afghanistan is the mining sector – under the condition if it is coupled with efficient 
institutional arrangements. The dynamics of the mining sector in Afghanistan is manifold. 
First, it will generate immense fiscal revenue for the government and will eliminate the huge 
fiscal deficit which is nearly 10 percent of GDP (ignoring the foreign grants). It will help 
Afghanistan achieve its fiscal sustainability without putting any constraint over spending. 
Secondly, through boosting exports and acquiring FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), it will 
decrease the trade deficit of nearly 40 percent of GDP and will significantly improve the 
balance-of-payments position of the country. It will also increase foreign exchange reserves 
of the central bank, and will prevent any balance-of-payments crisis subsequent to shocks in 
foreign aid. Finally, by attracting huge FDI in the country it will provide employment to 
thousands of skilled and non-skilled workers in the country and will help reduce 
unemployment. 
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 The total value of mineral deposits in Afghanistan has been estimated between US$ 1 
and $3 trillion.1 Geological Surveys by the US and the UK have shown that Afghanistan 
holds huge deposits of iron ore, copper, cobalt, gold, lithium, niobium, uranium, mercury, 
barite, chromites, and zinc. The deposits of copper and iron ore are some of the largest in the 
world, consisting of 60 and 2,200 million tonnes, respectively. The amount of lithium in 
Afghanistan is also significant, as official US sources have stated that Afghanistan could 
become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium.” Surveys have also shown that there are huge blocks of 
oil and natural gas in northern Afghanistan. It is estimated that there are 3.4 billion barrels of 
crude oil,
2
 444 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and 562 million barrels of natural gas 
liquids in the country.3 Moreover, precious and semi-precious stones such as high-quality 
emerald, lapis lazuli (of which Afghanistan holds the largest and the unique-quality reserves 
in the world) and ruby are found in huge volumes in Afghanistan.4  
 Almost all these mineral and fuel resources are untapped. Only in 2008 did the 
Afghan government award the Aynak copper deposit to a Chinese firm under a US$ 3.3 
billion deal. The 30-year lease will provide the government with $400 million in royalties 
each year, in addition to $800 million down payment from the developer. The production is 
scheduled to start in 2013, and the project is expected to create some 6,000 direct 
employment opportunities. Nonetheless, if other mineral and fuel deposits are awarded to the 
private sector in the same manner, the natural resources sector could turn into an engine of 
economic growth and a principal source of fiscal revenue for Afghanistan. Official estimates 
show that annual revenue from mines will reach $1.5 billion in the next five years and $3.5 
billion within a decade and a half.5 However, this dissertation argues that current benchmarks 
are still modest. Potentials in the mining sector are promising, and if more efforts are made, 
the outcome will be much higher. 
How to avoid the natural resource curse in Afghanistan? 
 Natural resource abundance does not always lead to high economic growth and better 
macroeconomic stability. Some resource-rich countries in the world, such as Nigeria, 
Venezuela and Bolivia, were not able to achieve satisfactory growth performance and are 
                                                
1 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html (accessed 21/07/2011) and 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7835657/Afghanistan-claims-mineral-wealth-is-
worth-3trillion.html (accessed 21/07/2011) 
2 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/08/20108159431776396.html (accessed 21/07/2011) 
3 Source: “Assessment of Undiscovered Petroleum Resources of Northern Afghanistan.” Fact Sheet 2006-3031. 
USGS. March 2006 
4 Source: “Preliminary assessment of non-fuel mineral resources of Afghanistan.” Fact Sheet 2007-3063. USGS. 
October 2007 
5 http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/05/31/revenue-mines-reach-15b-5-years-shahrani (accessed 21/07/2011) 
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faced with many development challenges. Empirical studies indicate three major problems 
with natural resources. First, natural resource exploitation leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate which, in turn, negatively affects the exports. The deterioration of terms of 
trade subsequent to natural resource exploitation is called the “Dutch Disease,” named after 
the Netherlands’ experience in the 1970s when the prices of tradable goods increased and the 
manufactured exports declined after that they started extracting their resources. The second 
problem associated with the natural resources is that they generate “rents” and encourage 
rent-seeking behaviour in the economy. As a result, resources are not invested in productive 
and efficient sectors and thus it leads to a dampening of growth in the long-run. Finally, 
natural resources make democracy malfunction and resource-abundant countries tend to have 
autocratic governments. In fractionalised countries (with multiple ethnic groups), natural 
resources have been a source of conflict and political instability. 
 These three factors associated with natural resources have popularised the concept of 
“natural resource curse.” Recently, studies have tended to support a new theory of natural 
resources. It suggests that there is an indirect relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth. Natural resources affect economic growth through the channel of 
“institutions” (Easterly and Levine, 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Isham et al., 
2003). In institutionally weak countries, natural resources encourage corruption, further 
damage the institutional quality, and reduce the government’s aptitude in bringing structural 
reforms in the fiscal sector, in diversifying their economies and in seeking long-term growth 
strategies. It is through these institutional deficiencies that natural resources affect economic 
growth.  
Hence, one way to avoid the “curse” of natural resources is to improve the quality of 
institutions in the country, such as increased transparency and accountability, effective rule of 
law, efficient judiciary system to constrain corruption and rent-seeking, higher capacity in 
government institutions, and promotion of democratic institutions. Nevertheless, these 
institutional reinforcements need to be supported by measures to build “social capacity and 
political consensus” in resource abundant countries (Woolcock et al., 2001). Only by doing 
so, the negative impact of natural resources on institutions could be overcome. More details 
on the institutions will be discussed in the next sub-sections. 
 Economists have also proposed various economic measures which could help 
overcome the negative macroeconomic effects of natural resources.1 Some economists have 
                                                
1 Rosser (2006) has provided a good synthesis of major recommendations that have been made to overcome the 
resource curse. 
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suggested that resource-rich countries should distribute all their natural resource revenues 
directly to the citizens (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Their argument is that by 
transferring the “rents” to the citizens, there will not be any incentive for corruption and 
misappropriation within the government. The objective is to transform the resource-abundant 
country to a “non-resource abundant” country in which there will be no windfall revenue that 
would encourage rent-seeking and corroding behaviour.  
 Another group of economists have argued in favour of privatising the natural 
resources sector. These economists maintain that privatisation may limit rent-seeking, and the 
government will have less opportunity for excessive spending and borrowing. Weinthal and 
Luong (2001) have emphasised that privatisation offers a potential path out of the resource 
curse “only if it involves a transfer of ownership to domestic interests.” That is due to the 
relative bargaining power between the state and the private companies. Foreign companies 
have a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis the state only in the short-run because the government 
needs capital to develop its resources. But once the foreign investors had their capital sunk in 
the country, the bargaining power shifts to the government. However, the domestic investors 
are present in the country over a long-term, and thus they help develop a viable tax system in 
the country because both the government and the domestic companies need one another to 
survive. Therefore, although privatisation may offer a way out of the resource curse, it has a 
“more positive impact on the development of tax regimes when the transfer of ownership is 
to domestic investors.” 
 There have also been suggestions that resource rents could be allocated to the export 
sector which is affected by the Dutch Disease. The rents could be targeted at lowering the 
costs of exports. For example, natural resources surplus can be used in improving 
transportation infrastructure which could lower the transportation costs, or can be used to 
build export processing zones (EPZ) that can boost economic activity through economies of 
agglomeration. Another way to offset the Dutch Disease is to spend the resource rents on 
activities that have large import content. In this case, it will prevent the appreciation of 
exchange rate. These activities vary from one country to another, depending on its trade and 
production structures. In low-income countries, sectors such as transportation, infrastructure, 
and communications have generally high import content. 
Natural resources could also create serious macroeconomic instability through the 
fiscal channel, following volatility in world commodity prices. During a price boom, as the 
fiscal revenues increase, the government increases overall spending and initiate new projects 
which take a few years to complete. When the prices crash, the government finds it extremely 
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difficult to reduce the spending – due to political and social constraints – and the undergoing 
projects are left uncompleted owing to a lack of financing. Therefore, the boom and busts in 
world commodity prices generate strong volatility in the economy and may increase external 
debt. Some economists have thus suggested that resource-rich countries need to diversify 
their economies so as to reduce their dependence on natural resources. Others have 
recommended the creation of “stabilisation funds,” such as those in Norway and Kuwait, in 
order to reduce the impact of shocks to commodity prices. However, in countries with 
widespread corruption and lack of transparency and accountability, this option seems less 
productive.  
 To conclude based on the above suggestions, I emphasise there are many possible 
ways for Afghanistan to overcome the natural resource curse. Afghanistan has already opted 
for the privatisation of the mining sector which will limit corruption and rent-seeking. Since 
Afghanistan’s chief exports are agricultural or agriculture-related products, the natural 
resources rents could be allocated to the agriculture sector in various forms without 
necessarily discriminating between the exporters and non-exporters. Moreover, improving the 
quality of institutions is an indispensable step for Afghanistan. In fact, not all institutionally-
weak countries which discovered their natural resources fell into the resource curse. 
Countries such as Botswana, Indonesia and Mexico had weak institutions at the time they 
started their resource extraction, but they all succeeded to improve and strengthen their 
institutions and to overcome the resource “curse.” Other economists, too, have not shown a 
total pessimism for the discovery of natural resources in Afghanistan, despite the current state 
of affairs in the country. As one economist puts it, while it “is not overly encouraging for 
Afghanistan it is not completely gloomy either” (Beckman, 2010). “Afghanistan's potentially 
vast mineral resources are no guarantee of democracy and prosperity. But they do not 
condemn this country to eternal corruption, poverty and war either” (Haber and Menaldo, 
2010). 
Remarks on sectoral-growth approach: 
 The recommendation made in this section is basically a sectoral approach to growth. 
However, this should not be conceived as a policy calling for a privileged status or a favoured 
treatment to the chosen sectors. The objective is to simply remove the institutional barriers 
and constraints in those sectors which have the potential to increase the overall growth in the 
economy. Growth will not be limited uniquely to the chosen sectors but, in fact, growth will 
also be generated in other sectors due to growth-linkages which exist between them.  
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The role of the government is double-folded in this approach. First, it has to identify 
the “key” sectors in the economy, and secondly it should identify and remove the constraints 
and distortions in these sectors so that market is made to function in them (Chandra, 2006). 
The former suggests that the selection of sectors be based on the criteria that they will 
generate economy-wide growth. The latter not only requires that the government identifies 
the existing institutional constraints and economic distortions, but also that it addresses the 
problem of “coordination externalities.” In fact, many sectors require simultaneous, large-
scale investments to be made, in order to become profitable and to attract private investors. 
Coordination failures can arise whenever a sector exhibits scale economies. Dani Rodrik 
(2007) has explained that, in the presence of coordination externalities, government will be 
required to coordinate the investment and production decisions of entrepreneurs. Thus, in the 
case of Afghanistan the government needs to make large-scale investments in the sectors of 
agriculture and natural resources so that it would be able to attract private investment in these 
sectors. However, Rodrik (2007) emphasises that the appropriate policy is the one which is 
targeted on “activities” which produce the characteristics of a coordination failure, rather than 
on sectors per se. This facilitates structuring the public support “as a corrective to specific 
market failures instead of generic support for this or that sector.” He explains that only those 
activities should be selected which have “the potential to crowd in other, complementary 
investments or generate informational or technological spillovers.”  
On this question whether the government in Afghanistan should target a sector or a 
specific activity, I argue that, under the current framework proposed for the correction of 
macroeconomic instability, it is more appropriate that the Afghan government targets the 
sectors of natural resources and agriculture as a whole. The objective in here is to achieve the 
desired “outcome” from each sector in order to overcome the relevant sources of instability.  
As stated in the beginning of this section, I do not intend to specify the relevant policy 
instruments for the selected key sectors. For, that requires a more thorough study of sector-
specific constraints and opportunities. In the following, I briefly present some general 
strategy points which seem necessary to be highlighted. First of all, to borrow the words of 
Rodrik, the government needs to embed private initiative in a framework of public action that 
encourages economic development and technological dynamism beyond what market forces 
on their own would generate. Both ‘overly relying on a free-market mechanism supposed to 
meet all expectations in an economy with numerous distortions,’ and ‘reviving the old 
protectionist practices of the country’ will be worse choices for Afghanistan. The right model 
is to seek a “strategic collaboration between the private sector and the government with the 
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aim of uncovering the most significant obstacles to restructuring and determining what 
interventions are most likely to remove them” (Rodrik, 2007). 
A proper strategy for the natural resources sector in Afghanistan is to privatise the 
mining projects – but not other resources such as forests – and to equally consider the 
domestic interests besides the foreign investors. However, strengthening the institutions must 
be the ultimate task of the government. Promotion of check-and-balances and creating an 
accountable and transparent environment are keys to overcoming the resource curse. Next, 
the surplus obtained from the natural resources sector should be allocated for development 
projects, especially in those projects and activities which have high-import content – this is 
for avoiding the Dutch Disease. The resource rents should be primarily targeted at the exports 
sector – which happens to be the same as the agriculture sector; almost all major Afghan 
export items are agriculture or agriculture-related products, e.g. dried fruits, fresh fruits, 
animal products, and carpets. These rents can be allocated in various forms such as financing 
projects for infrastructure and irrigation systems, modernising the agriculture sector, 
conducting research and development, creating processing units for raw agricultural 
materials, or simply providing subsidies to farmers. If the provision of subsidies to farmers 
does not discriminate between the exporters and non-exporters or between the exported items 
and non-exported items in the agriculture sector, then it will not violate the international laws 
and agreements. Although international regulations (for ex. WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies) 
authorise export subsidies for countries with GNP per capita of less than $1000 per year. 
Moreover, the government should adopt policies aimed at intensifying the agricultural 
production by increasing productivity and adopting the technologies appropriate for 
Afghanistan’s agro-ecological condition, developing supply chains around small-scale 
farmers (such as input markets, seasonal finance, and marketing systems), modernising the 
agriculture sector, and finally expanding the cultivated land. 
(ii) Diversifying the production structure 
 
 Section II.2.1. also diagnosed that the great exposure of the Afghan economy to 
external shocks is one of the major sources of macroeconomic instability in the country. This 
exposure is due to low level of diversification in the production structure. When the economy 
is less diversified, the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on the economy is intensified. Hence, 
diversification helps reduce the negative effects of external shocks which are transmitted 
through the trade channel. 
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  In an important paper, Jean Imbs and Romain Wacziarg (2003) examined the patterns 
of sectoral concentration and diversification in a large cross-section of countries. They found 
that “sectoral concentration follows a U-shaped pattern in relation to per capita income” – a 
finding which does not go along with most existing theories, as the latter predicts a 
monotonic relationship between income and sectoral concentration. Their findings show that 
early in the development process, countries diversify and this continues until a relatively late 
stage of development. When countries reach a level of per capita income roughly equal to 
$9000 (in 1985 constant US dollars), they start specialising. They emphasized that “increased 
sectoral specialization, although a significant development, applies only to high-income 
economies. Countries diversify over most of their development path.” 
 Diversification of the production structure requires “discovery” of an economy’s cost 
structure – that is, discovery of which new activities can be produced at low enough cost to 
be profitable. Ricardo Hausmann and Dari Rodrik (2003) have called this process as “self-
discovery” – learning what a country is good at producing. In fact, investment in new 
activities and in new sectors has a large social value. But their private return is too low, 
because the first entrepreneur who invests in a new activity will have to share the value of his 
discovery with other entrepreneurs who will quickly emulate. Conversely, if his investment in 
the new activity fails to be profitable, he will bear the full cost of his failure. Thus, learning 
what a country is good at producing requires an investment, but the returns to that investment 
are not fully appropriated. Hausmann and Rodrik explain that free entry by competitors (i.e. 
imitators or copycats) “makes the nonappropriability problem worse, and undercuts the 
incentive to invest in discovering what a country is good at producing. Laissez-faire cannot 
be optimal solution under these circumstances,” just as it is not in the case of new innovations 
in advanced countries, and that’s why they are protected by patents. 
 The framework which Hausman and Rodrik have proposed highlights that 
entrepreneurship in underdeveloped countries may have been constrained by inadequate 
inducements to discovery costs in new activities, and not mainly by inadequate property 
rights or lack of access to imported technologies. The new discoveries in developing 
countries does not involve coming up with new products or processes, but “discovering” that 
a certain good, already well established in world markets, can be produced at home at low 
costs. This may require some “technological tinkering” to adapt foreign technology to 
domestic conditions, but rarely this technological tinkering is patentable and therefore 
monopolisable (Rodrik, 2007). Furthermore, transferring a certain technology to a new 
economic and institutional environment has always an uncertain probability of success.  
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 This constraint to the self-discovery process is nothing but “information 
externalities.” Information externalities, along with “coordination externalities” which was 
explained in page 75, are the two factors which blunt the incentives for productive 
diversification. “Both are reasons to believe that diversification is unlikely to take place 
without direct government intervention or other public action” (Rodrik, 2007). Thus, the 
government needs to “encourage entrepreneurship and investment in new activities ex ante, 
but push out unproductive firms and sectors ex post” (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). 
 The first-best policy response to the informational externalities that restrict self-
discovery is to subsidise investments in new activities. This can be done though providing 
public credit or guarantees, public R&D, temporary monopolies, tax incentives, or even trade 
protection (Rodrik, 2007). Although the proposition of these sets of instruments is basically 
an industrial policy, but I propose nothing more than a “strategic coordination” between the 
government and the private sector in order to find the underlying costs and opportunities of 
new discoveries in Afghanistan. The choice of instruments in this context must be made with 
more prudence because they may create other distortions in the economy and are subject to 
moral hazard if they are not well calculated and well designed.  
Given the current constraints, barriers and obstacles for self-discovery in Afghanistan, 
diversification could only be possible if the private sector is provided with incentives from 
the government. But close watch must be paid because “any system of incentives designed to 
help private investors venture into new activities can end up as a mechanism of rent transfer 
to unscrupulous businessmen and self-interested bureaucrats” (Rodrik, 2007). Therefore, the 
policy should be embedded in an appropriate institutional context so that corruption and rent-
seeking behaviour are fully prevented. 
 At first look, the first two proposed policies aimed at correcting macroeconomic 
instability in Afghanistan might seem in contradiction. Whilst the first policy encourages 
sectoral concentration and specialisation (in agriculture and natural resources), the second 
policy goes in the opposite direction. But in fact, the first policy should be considered in the 
same context as the second one; both policies aim at discovering the productive potential of 
Afghanistan, and most of its potentials lie in the sectors of agriculture and natural resources. 
In addition, the first policy comes in support of and as a means to achieve the second one. 
Increasing agricultural and mining output will help stabilise the macroeconomic environment 
– which is a necessary condition for attracting entrepreneurs to new activities – and will 
provide the government with sufficient funds (i.e. resource rents) to support the private sector 
in discovering new potential activities. 
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(iii) Acquiring high-quality institutions 
 
 Having high-quality institutions will not only dissipate the adverse effects of external 
shocks, and hence help stabilise the macroeconomic environment, but will also help contain 
the social conflict and the redistributive struggle of political elite triggered by social 
fragmentation. Having strong, efficient and democratic institutions is also a condition for 
getting “blessed” by natural resources instead of getting “cursed” by it. But which type of 
institutions should Afghanistan try to develop and acquire? and what is the best way of 
getting such institutions? 
1
 
 New Institutional Economics maintain that markets need to be supported by non-
market institutions because markets are not self-creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing, or 
self-legitimizing. Thus, in order for markets to function well, there need to be five types of 
market institutions alongside the markets: property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions 
for macroeconomic stabilisation, institutions for social insurance, and institutions of conflict 
management. 
 The role of the first three types of market-supporting institutions in a market economy 
is well understood: property rights are necessary to guarantee an adequate control over the 
return to the assets (e.g. an innovation) that are produced by entrepreneurs; regulatory 
institutions curb fraud, anticompetitive behaviour, and moral hazard; and institutions for 
macroeconomic stabilisation help smooth out the real, financial, monetary and external 
shocks in order to provide a stable and predictable environment for economic activity. 
However, institutions for social insurance are also necessary because they legitimise a market 
economy by rendering it compatible with social stability and social cohesion. In fact, 
economic reforms based on a market-oriented system are often met by resistance from people 
in developing countries. The result is usually economic and social insecurity. Thus, 
institutions of social insurance help achieve a social cohesion in the country. Finally, 
institutions of conflict management are also indispensable, because countries can well get 
caught – sometime in their history – by instances of conflict among social factions. The rule 
of law, high-quality judiciary system, representative political institutions, free elections, 
independent trade unions, social partnerships, and institutionalised representation of minority 
groups are examples of such institutions. They tend to increase the incentives for social 
groups to cooperate by reducing the payoff to socially uncooperative strategies. 
                                                
1 The next paragraphs are largely based on Rodrik’s (2003) articles entitled “Institutions for High-Quality 
Growth” and “Getting Institutions Right.” 
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 The most important point is that there is no unique type of institutions for a market 
economy. There is a large variety of regulatory, stabilizing, and legitimizing institutions that 
can support a well-functioning market economy. The acquisition of institutions depends on 
local knowledge, experiences and capabilities. Institutions need to be developed locally – 
they cannot be independent of a country’s history, culture and social norms. But one can 
always learn from the institutional arrangements prevailing in other countries – best practices, 
and international codes and standards can always help.  
 In all cases, the development of institutions must be based on democratic structures. 
Participatory political institutions are proven to deliver a stable long-term growth, a greater 
short-term stability, a better management of adverse shocks, and a better wealth distribution 
in the economy. Democracy, which can be considered as a metainstitution, helps build better 
institutions compared to autocratic regimes. 
(iv) Developing sound financial sector 
 
 The presence of a sound, healthy financial sector is a vital element for private-sector 
development, and crucial for the implementation of the earlier policy; i.e. diversification of 
the economy. Entrepreneurial talents and new ideas exist in every country, but what lacks in 
some countries is access to capital. Sound financial intermediaries can provide such funds for 
productive investments. Not only does financial development increase economic growth, it 
also reduces the impact of exogenous shocks by offering economic agents mechanisms for 
self-insurance and hedging. 
 A good strategy for financial deepening would involve mobilising a larger volume of 
savings from the domestic economy (i.e. increasing the ratio of national savings to GDP) and 
enhancing the accessibility of capitals for all types of domestic investments. The essence of 
financial deepening is to aim at having positive real interest rates or, at least, to avoid sharply 
negative real rates. However, in the presence of volatile inflation rate, this seems a difficult 
task – and risky, too – but it demands an efficient monetary policy system. Moreover, 
commercial banks are good at providing short-term credits, but longer-term investment 
requires longer-term finance. Therefore, financial institutions specialising in longer-term 
finance – such as insurance companies, investment banks, and security markets – are also 
indispensable for the economy. In this case, the intervention of government is required to 
develop such institutions, especially for the security markets. 
 The most important of all is to have a strong financial regulation and supervision 
system. Especially as commercial banks in Afghanistan keep expanding and will eventually 
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start investing abroad, adequate system of prudential regulation and effective supervision is 
essential to prevent any crises in the banking sector due to systemic risk and/or external 
financial shocks. Strengthening prudential supervision requires a variety of institutional 
reforms, including an exposure limit on lending to connected parties (most importantly 
owners and affiliated companies), – the lack of which was the main factor behind Kabul 
Bank’s failure (see page 63) – fixing a criteria for provisioning of nonperforming loans, 
preventing concentration of credit to single borrowers, emphasising for collateral 
requirements, and raising bank capital to levels commensurate with the volatile 
macroeconomic environment in the country.  
 Although important banking sector reforms have so far been implemented by the 
Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank), still much more effort must be paid. Developing an 
adequate legal framework, encouraging better public disclosure of banks’ financial condition, 
creating better transparency, implementing better financial reporting standards, and finally 
ensuring better contract enforcement are some of the critical reforms that must be undertaken 
in Afghanistan. Pavlović and Charap (2009) studied the commercial banking system in 
Afghanistan and reported that the country lacks adequate legal framework for the financial 
sector. The authors also highlighted that some weak commercial banks “engage in extra-
judicial, non-traditional contract enforcement.” The financial services that these banks are 
providing are, in fact, lacking in the system. The authors concluded “it appears crucial that 
DAB strengthen further its prudential oversight.” 
   
Conclusion 
 
 Macroeconomic instability which is seen as an endemic phenomenon in developing 
countries has become a first-order issue of interest in development macroeconomics in recent 
years. Macroeconomic instability can be defined as a situation where: (i) unsustainable 
imbalances appear in the economy; (ii) variability in key macroeconomic variables is large 
(i.e. exceeding a certain threshold); and/or (iii) macroeconomic environment is highly 
uncertain. Empirical studies have identified numerous factors which instigate and exacerbate 
macroeconomic instability, such as terms-of-trade shocks, supply-side shocks, costly market-
access, geographical remoteness, social fragmentation, higher degree of trade openness, 
financial underdevelopment, sudden and unregulated financial integration, weak institutions, 
low degree of diversification, distortionary macroeconomic policies, aid volatility, and 
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microeconomic rigidities. These sources of instability are not mutually exclusive, and may 
interact in various ways.  
This dissertation argued that the effects of external (such as terms-of-trade shocks or 
aid volatility) and internal shocks (such as climatic shock or productivity shocks) are 
determined by the structural characteristics of the economy which act as a risk-management 
mechanism. Well-developed financial sector, well-managed capital-account liberalization, 
higher export and production diversification, lower market-access costs, strong and efficient 
institutions, and “good” policies may decrease the negative effects of exogenous shocks. The 
paper also explained that macroeconomic instability is both a cause and a reflection of 
underdevelopment. Whilst macroeconomic instability negatively affects the long-term growth 
and thus development, it is also the result of the co-existence of various ‘underdeveloped 
structures’ in the economy. Therefore, dealing with macroeconomic instability should be an 
important part of development strategies, and only a mix of stabilisation and structural 
policies will be able to effectively overcome instability. Studies have also shown that 
macroeconomic instability has significant costs in terms of welfare loss, increase in 
inequality and poverty, and reduction in long-term growth.  
 The case study focused on macroeconomic instability in Afghanistan. Through a 
diagnostic approach to the issue, it identified the sources of instability in Afghanistan and 
proposed a series of policies and reforms in order to overcome macroeconomic instability in 
the country. It identified that terms-of-trade shocks, supply-side shocks (mainly climatic 
shocks), low degree of diversification, weak institutions, political instability and shocks, and 
social fragmentation are the principal sources of instability in Afghanistan. To overhaul these 
sources of instability, the government should (1) stimulate output in key sectors, namely 
agriculture and natural resources sectors; (2) diversify the production structure of the 
economy; (3) acquire high-quality institutions; and (4) develop a sound, healthy financial 
sector. 
 Agriculture sector is the key to long-term, stable growth in Afghanistan because it is 
the only sector which has sufficient scale and growth-linkages in the economy to ensure a 
sustainable growth. Natural resources, on the other hand, will help Afghanistan achieve its 
fiscal sustainability and improve its balance-of-payments position. Natural resource “curse” 
should not discourage seeking such a strategy, because there are many ways to avoid it. 
Furthermore, diversification of the production structure should be conceived as a process of 
“self-discovery” – discovery of the economy’s cost structure. The government should engage 
in a strategic collaboration with the private sector to discover the potential activities in the 
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country which are likely to be competitive. For this to be successful, the government must 
provide adequate inducements for entrepreneurs to engage in new activities, by increasing the 
private return to investments as close as possible to their social value. 
 Acquiring high-quality institutions should be an ultimate objective of the government, 
because not only do they dissipate the adverse effects of external shocks on the economy, 
they also help contain the conflict triggered by social fragmentation and constrain the 
corruption and the rent-seeking behaviour encouraged by natural resource rents. Institutions 
should be developed based on local knowledge, experiences and capabilities, but learning 
from the institutional arrangements prevailing in other countries can always help. Moreover, 
institutional reinforcements must be supported by measures to achieve social cohesion and 
political consensus in order for them to be efficient. Finally, financial development must be 
carried out effectively in order to enable the private sector to play its crucial role in the 
development and diversification of the economy. The Central Bank must further strengthen 
its prudential regulation and effective financial supervision. The authorities must develop an 
adequate legal framework for the financial sector and ensure better contract enforcement in 
the banking sector in Afghanistan. 
 The framework proposed in this dissertation for analysing and diagnosing 
macroeconomic instability can be applied to other developing countries and may serve as an 
efficient methodology for policy analysis and recommendation in such countries.  
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